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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, the controversy over Napster changed copyright forever. 
When Metallica sued to stop what it called an “insidious and ongoing 
thievery scheme,”
1
 the band started a fierce battle between the music 
and film industries and their consumers. Seemingly overnight, fans 
became selfish “free-riders”
2
 with “the moral fiber of common loot-
ers.”
3
 For the last fifteen years, society has perceived the future of our 
creative industries as dependent upon stopping free-riders, but the war 
against free-riding is not going well. Surge after surge has failed to 
keep “pirates” from looting, filching, and stealing digital copies of 
music, films, and books.
4
 A recent industry report estimates that just 
under thirty percent of Internet users are engaged in infringement, up 
by thirty-seven percent in fifteen months.
5
 The same figures suggest 
that infringing content now makes up 23.8% of all Internet traffic in 
North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region.
6
 Copyright is 
now facing a crisis: A large proportion of ordinary consumers appar-
ently have little respect for the law or the artists they are ripping off. 
It turns out, however, that much of what we know about copyright 
and free-riders is wrong. In many cases, the free-riding fans who 
download illicit content are also some of the content industries’ big-
gest customers.
7
 More importantly, it turns out that fans often really 
                                                                                                                  
1. STEVEN M. GILLON, THE AMERICAN PARADOX: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
SINCE 1945 381 (3d ed. 2013); Lee Marshall, Metallica and Morality: The Rhetorical Bat-
tleground of the Napster Wars, 1 ENT. L. 1, 12 (2002). 
2. For a discussion on how the rhetoric of “free-riding,” obtaining content without pay-
ing, has been used to denote infringement in intellectual property, see Mark A. Lemley, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032–46 (2004). 
3. See LEE MARSHALL, BOOTLEGGING: ROMANTICISM AND COPYRIGHT IN THE MUSIC 
INDUSTRY 85 (2005). 
4. See JESSICA REYMAN, THE RHETORIC OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COPYRIGHT LAW 
AND THE REGULATION OF DIGITAL CULTURE 63 (2010) (discussing “the introduction of the 
character of the pirate into the copyright story”). 
5. David Price, NetNames Piracy Analysis: Sizing the Piracy Universe, NETNAMES 8 
(Sept. 2013), http://www.netnames.com/digital-piracy-sizing-piracy-universe. 
6. Id. at 3. 
7. See, e.g., Enigmax, Suppressed Report Found Busted Pirate Site Users Were Good 
Consumers, TORRENTFREAK (July 19, 2011), https://torrentfreak.com/suppressed-report-
found-busted-pirate-site-users-were-good-consumers-110719/ (reporting results of a study 
by Society for Consumer Research); Ernesto, Pirates Are the Music Industry’s Most Valua-
ble Customers, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 22, 2010), https://torrentfreak.com/pirates-are-the-
music-industrys-most-valuable-customers-100122/ (reporting results of a lobbying group 
study showing that music sharers are more likely to purchase digital music); Joe Karaganis, 
HADOPI Says: Let’s Try Cutting off Nose To Spite Face, THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY (July 
26, 2011), http://piracy.americanassembly.org/hadopi-says-lets-try-cutting-off-nose-to-
spite-face/ (reporting on results from a study of French users by the HADOPI copyright 
enforcement authority showing that approximately two thirds of high-volume purchasers 
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want to support the artists they love. When Radiohead famously re-
leased their 2007 album, In Rainbows, as a digital download for any 
price, their fans chose to pay a total of approximately $3 million.
8
 
Since then, a series of experiments with pay-what-you-want 
(“PWYW”) pricing in many different creative industries has reliably 
shown that when given the choice of what to pay, audiences will often 
pay more than the minimum amount to access creative works. The 
independent game developer 2D Boy raised over $100,000 in two 
weeks by making its game, World of Goo, available for whatever 
price people wanted to pay.
9
 Semaphore Press showed that, given a 
choice, eighty-three percent of law students chose to pay for case-
books, and eighty-seven percent of those paid the suggested price.
10
 
Nearly 25,000 of Amanda Palmer’s fans paid just under $1.2 million 
in aggregate for her latest album before it was even produced; the al-
bum continues to be available on her website as a PWYW download 
under a Creative Commons license.
11
 Over the last few years, millions 
of consumers have chosen to pay over $65 million for games offered 
by Humble Bundle on PWYW terms.
12
 Institutions, too, are often 
willing to pay for access when they could otherwise free-ride. CERN, 
for example, is bringing together over one thousand libraries to volun-
tarily pay the costs of making physics research accessible to every-
                                                                                                                  
also acknowledge illicit file-sharing). Note that the more complex question about the aggre-
gate effect of file-sharing on copyright industry revenues remains contested. 
8. Andrew Lipsman, For Radiohead Fans, Does “Free” + “Download” = “Freeload”?, 
COMSCORE (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2007/11/ 
Radiohead_Downloads; David Byrne and Thom Yorke on the Real Value of Music, WIRED 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/magazine/16-
01/ff_yorke?currentPage=all; Andrew Lipsman, For Those of You Wondering About 
comScore’s Radiohead Study . . . , COMSCORE (Nov. 8, 2007), https://www.comscore. 
com/ita/Insights/Blog/For_those_of_you_wondering_about_comScore_s_Radiohead_study. 
9. John Walker, World of Goo Sale Offers Fascinating Results, ROCK, PAPER, SHOTGUN 
(Oct. 20, 2009, 12:58 PM), http://www.rockpapershotgun.com/2009/10/20/world-of-goo-
sale-provides-fascinating-results/. 
10. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Viability of the $30 (or Less) Casebook 14 (Lewis & Clark 
L. Sch. Legal Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-19, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2268057. 
11. See Amanda Palmer, Amanda Palmer: The New Record, Art Book, and Tour, 
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/amandapalmer/amanda-palmer-the-
new-record-art-book-and-tour (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Amanda Palmer, Theatre Is Evil 
Digital, AMANDAPALMER.NET, http://amandapalmer.net/products/theatre-is-evil-digital/ 
[hearinafter Palmer, Theatre] (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). Creative Commons provides 
simple, easy to use copyright licensing options which allow content creators to easily identi-
fy and broadcast their chosen rights; for example, Amanda Palmer licensed her album under 
an Attribution NonCommercial ShareAlike license which allows non-commercial reuse of 
the album provided that Palmer is credited and any resulting work is shared under the same 
license. See id.; Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 
4.0), CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2014). 
12. Prior Bundle Statistics, HUMBLE BUNDLE, https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140216191747/http://support.humblebundle.com/customer/portal/articles/281031-prior-
bundle-statistics (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (accessed through the Internet Archive index). 
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one,
13
 and a similar project, Knowledge Unlatched, has signed up 
nearly 300 libraries to pay the costs of publishing open access books 
that are free to the world.
14
 
The success of these experiments shakes the very foundations of 
copyright theory. Copyright provides a mechanism for professional 
producers of creative works to exclude free-riders and recoup their 
costs through sales and licensing. Copyright economics is fundamen-
tally built on the assumption that consumers will avoid paying for 
access if they can. In this Article, I argue that this outdated model of 
the consumer as a self-interested rational actor reflects only a small 
part of human motivation. While consumers of creative works will 
often free-ride, they also very often choose not to, when they are giv-
en the choice. In fact, a large body of evidence from behavioral eco-
nomics and the social sciences demonstrates that people are motivated 
to pay, not only because of their own self-interest, but also because of 
personal morality and social norms of fairness and reciprocity. Studies 
have shown that, across many different cultures, about fifty percent of 
people behave as “conditional cooperators.” That is, they are general-
ly willing to contribute to a public good if others do as well.
15
 Only 
about a third of the population acts as the rational, self-interested, 
wealth-maximizing free-riders that copyright theory assumes.
16
  
This insight has two profound implications. First, it suggests that 
current policy and industry approaches to the copyright crisis brought 
about by the Internet are deeply flawed. While modern copyright re-
form debates typically focus on deterring self-interested free-riders, 
that focus ignores the real problem: copyright is losing its normative 
legitimacy.
17
 If people are largely motivated by fairness, the perceived 
inability of copyright law and business models to provide fair out-
comes for artists or consumers is devastating. Surprisingly, the key to 
winning the war on piracy is not continuing to ratchet up the strength 
of copyright penalties, but instead increasing the fairness of the sys-
tem. 
The second implication is more radical. I argue that the focus on 
free-riders in copyright is fundamentally misplaced. Because we care 
                                                                                                                  
13. See S. BIANCO ET AL., TOWARDS OPEN ACCESS PUBLISHING IN HIGH ENERGY 
PHYSICS: REPORT OF THE SCOAP3 WORKING PARTY (CERN 2007), 
http://scoap3.org/files/Scoap3WPReport.pdf. 
14. Press Release, Knowledge Unlatched, Knowledge Unlatched Pilot Collection to Be-
come Open Access (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.knowledgeunlatched.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/03/Pilot_Press_Release_10Mar2014.pdf. 
15. See Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis, Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Exper-
imental and Analytical Foundations, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 50 (2007). 
16. Id. 
17. See generally Paula Dootson & Nicolas Suzor, The Game of Clones and the Australia 
Tax: Divergent Views About Copyright Business Models and the Willingness of Australian 
Consumers To Infringe, U.N.S.W. L.J. (forthcoming 2015), http://eprints.qut.edu.au/75933/ 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (discussing the attitudes of consumers to copyright and provid-
ing qualitative evidence of a significant gap between the law and social norms). 
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about efficiency, fairness to authors, and the flow of knowledge and 
culture, we should actually encourage free-riding where possible. 
Copyright, to borrow a phrase, is the worst system for coordinating 
cultural production — except for all the other systems that have been 
tried. The insight that people will often voluntarily cooperate in fund-
ing public goods suggests that new systems might be able to support 
professional production in the creative industries without the great 
social costs that copyright imposes. I argue that we should reorient 
copyright theory, policy, and practice to the task of developing sus-
tainable systems that fund creative cultural production without ex-
cluding free-riders. Ultimately, copyright should focus less on the 
proportion of people who free-ride, and more on the absolute number 
of people who choose to pay. 
In this Article, I explain how producers can leverage both eco-
nomic incentives and social norms to fund professional cultural pro-
duction without excluding free-riders. These “peaceful revolutions” 
restructure copyright markets into cooperative systems based on “ne-
gotiation, consent, and self-interest.”18 In doing so, they represent an 
alternative system of coordinating creative production that is both 
more efficient and more suited to developing a “just and attractive”
19
 
culture than the current copyright system. Because these alternate sys-
tems provide a means to support the creative industries without exclu-
sivity, they enable much greater distribution and reuse of creative 
works, greatly reducing the social costs of traditional copyright sys-
tems. For this same reason, they also enable greater access to 
knowledge and cultural goods — prerequisites to the learning, self-
expression, and play that humans rely on to flourish. 
More work is required to understand the limits and implications 
of the cooperative systems that coordinate cultural production. The 
experiments that have been attempted so far provide ample proof of 
concept for the proposition that these models can be successful.
20
 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that these systems can operate 
to routinely support a diverse range of professional production across 
a variety of creative industries. I show how producers can employ 
three structural mechanisms to increase levels of cooperation in these 
circumstances: (1) providing alternate incentives and reward struc-
tures; (2) insulating cooperators from exploitation by free-riders; and 
(3) developing institutions that facilitate the development and en-
forcement of cooperative social norms amongst relatively stable 
groups of participants. Finally, I conclude by mapping out two new 
                                                                                                                  
18. PETER SUBER, OPEN ACCESS 146 (2012) (discussing consortia for funding open ac-
cess publishing and coining the term “peaceful revolution”). 
19. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 172 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
20. See infra the experiments discussed in Part III of this Article.  
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avenues for important future research: the first designed to understand 
more precisely when these systems are viable and the second to inves-
tigate their long-run impact by considering these modes of production 
as complex systems within the creative industries ecosystem.  
The success of alternate systems at coordinating production in the 
professional core of the creative industries should prompt us to recon-
sider some of the fundamental principles of copyright. In order to 
maximize the efficiency of the digital economy and opportunities for 
individuals to learn and to participate in culture, these alternate sys-
tems should be encouraged within the situations and industries in 
which they are viable. The important policy point is that copyright 
and public subsidies do not represent the only methods for coordinat-
ing cultural production. While alternate systems can coexist with con-
ventional systems, support of a varied innovation economy will 
emphasize different systems of cultural production in different cir-
cumstances. Identifying what these circumstances are is now both a 
key opportunity and a key challenge for copyright policy. 
Part I of this Article explains the foundational role that free-riders 
play in the basic justification for copyright law. Part II introduces a 
series of PWYW experiments in the creative industries and demon-
strates that consumers often choose not to free-ride. I provide four 
categories of social motivations that explain why people pay: 
(1) norms of pride, shame, and fairness; (2) concern for the welfare of 
third parties; (3) desire to reciprocate in kind; and (4) moral commit-
ments to alternate systems that enable more desirable outcomes. Part 
III argues that the mainstream focus on deterrence in copyright, the 
increased gap between law and practice, and the perceived failure of 
copyright to provide fair outcomes for either artists or consumers are 
all likely to dampen consumer reciprocity and encourage free-riding. 
Part IV canvasses a series of experiments where producers in the crea-
tive industries have attempted to use both incentives and reciprocity 
norms to fund the production of openly licensed goods (works that are 
free to copy, distribute, and remix by the public at large). While these 
forms of cooperative approaches are still relatively rare, they suggest 
that the range of systems for encouraging cultural production is much 
broader than is commonly assumed. Part V sets out the hypothesis 
that these “commons-based” systems of production can be more effi-
cient and more conducive to human flourishing than conventional 
copyright systems. Finally, I show why there is good reason to think 
this hypothesis is true, and outline new research methodologies that 
will enable it to be tested. 
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A. Method 
The research in this Article synthesizes existing studies of alter-
nate copyright business models through a novel conceptual lens. I 
have supplemented the existing theoretical and empirical base with 
additional case studies of experiments with PWYW pricing in cultural 
production. In order to examine how norms around paying and free-
riding are constructed and contested, I conducted a critical discourse 
analysis of publicly available comments and conversations by produc-
ers, participants, and observers.
21
 The experiments examined were 
chosen through theoretical sampling to highlight particularly unusual 
and revelatory instances where the social construction of motivations 
was being jointly developed by the commenters.
22
 For each case 
study, the most relevant discussions on the public web were identified 
and selected for analysis.
23
 Participant discourse in these discussion 
threads was analyzed to inductively refine the predictions from the 
literature and to saturate some of the gaps in existing research. While 
many of these models are still in their infancy, this qualitative study 
usefully fleshes out some of the ways that participants construct and 
contest prosocial norms in voluntary payment schemes. 
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
The common utilitarian justification for copyright is that it is “a 
tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.”
24
 It ap-
pears now that the role of copyright is not to provide authors with in-
centives to create,
25
 but to provide “incentives for capital.”
26
 Without 
                                                                                                                  
21. See generally Teun A. van Dijk, Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, 4 
DISCOURSE SOC’Y 249 (1993) (discussing critical discourse analysis as a research method-
ology). 
22. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt & Melissa E. Graebner, Theory Building from Cases: 
Opportunities and Challenges, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 25, 27 (2007) (explaining inductive 
theory building through theoretical sampling where “cases are selected because they are 
particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among con-
structs”). 
23. In particular, I examined comments in online discussion threads attached directly to 
PWYW and crowdfunding campaigns, as well as discussions on news websites, blogs, and 
interactive discussions with producers on other sites. While necessarily incomplete, use of 
this ‘naturally occurring data’ allowed me to investigate the way in which prosociality and 
free-riding is constructed and contested through discourse between participants in situ and 
in more general meta-commentary, enabling inductive theory building. See DAVID 
SILVERMAN, INTERPRETING QUALITATIVE DATA: METHODS FOR ANALYZING TALK, TEXT 
AND INTERATION 201 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the use of “naturally occurring data” in 
qualitative analysis). 
24. Baron Thomas Babington Macaulay, The First Speech on Copyright (Feb. 5, 1841), 
in MACAULAY’S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN’S ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION 
18, 25 (Charles Robert Gaston ed., 1914). 
25. For artists, the motivations for creative work have much more to do with desire and 
compulsion than with monetary compensation. See Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual 
Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-Work,” Two Stages in the Creative Pro-
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copyright, once a work is produced, it can be copied and redistributed 
very cheaply.
27
 Copyright provides the ability to exclude free-riders, 
allowing producers to sell copies to the public and recoup their costs 
of production. Copyright accordingly enables producers to invest the 
resources necessary to fund new productions, on the gamble that they 
will be successful. 
Copyright is considered necessary because users are generally as-
sumed to be free-riders. This dominant way of thinking about copy-
right stems from Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons and Olson’s 
Logic of Collective Action, which both assert that without private in-
centives, individuals are likely to free-ride rather than contribute to 
the maintenance or provision of public goods.
28
 Conventional ac-
counts of copyright accordingly assume that self-interested users will 
copy rather than pay for access to cultural and knowledge goods, lead-
ing to the underproduction of new works.
29
 This is the tragedy: it is in 
each individual’s direct interest to free-ride, but because people free-
ride, everyone is worse off on average. 
A number of well-known exceptions exist to this standard justifi-
cation, particularly where creators are able to cross-subsidize publish-
ing through other income.
30
 Advertisers, for example, support a great 
                                                                                                                  
cesses of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 2110 (2011); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 513, 515–16 (2009). The rewards of copyright accordingly do not appear to play a 
large role in motivating creative work. Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law 
Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 
1675 (2009). See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 612, 624–28 (2012) (arguing that the reward structures of copyright 
do not incentivize creative work). 
26. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research 
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 148 (2011) (arguing that in practical effect, copyright’s 
main role is in structuring markets to enable investment in expensive cultural production: 
“In particular, the incentives for capital that copyright supplies support mass culture indus-
tries and mass culture markets”). 
27. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 335 (1989) (“When [copyright protection] is very low, few or 
no works will be created, since free riding by copiers may prevent any author from covering 
his cost of expression.”). 
28. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (dis-
cussing humans’ “natural tendency to do the wrong thing”: “Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons.”); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965) 
(“[U]nless there is coercion . . . to make individuals act in the common interest rational, 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.”). 
29. See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 
47–48 (2008) (describing the rhetoric of “the tragedy of the commons” and arguing that 
“when policy makers see a resource that is unowned, they tend to reach reflexively for ‘the 
solving idea of property.’ . . . Lacking an ability to exclude [free riding], creators will be 
unable to charge for their creations; there will be inadequate incentives to create.”). 
30. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 309 (1970) (“Colleg-
es now pay for the creation of texts to some extent by paying salaries to their authors and 
allowing them time to write.”); cf. Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian 
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deal of free distribution of cultural works.
31
 Academics and other pro-
fessionals publish as a by-product of their paid employment, motivat-
ed by prestige or a desire to share their work with the public.
32
 
Producers in the creative and cultural industries have always relied 
upon public subsidies and private patronage to some extent.
33
 A great 
proportion of creative artists have little expectation of receiving sub-
stantial royalties from their works; they work second (and third) jobs 
to fund their personal creative work and meet their costs of publish-
ing.
34
 Additionally, an increasing number of creative professionals 
have chosen to give away fixed versions of their work (including re-
cordings, books, films, comics, and photographs) in order to increase 
exposure and stimulate demand for their services and value-added 
goods (e.g., live events, bespoke work, merchandise, and premium or 
limited edition works).
35
 
                                                                                                                  
Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 283 (1988) (“There are many 
mechanisms other than enforceable property rights for internalizing externalities, many of 
which are already in current use.”). 
31. See Joëlle Farchy, The Internet: Culture for Free, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL 
ECONOMICS 245, 249 (Ruth Towse ed., 2d ed. 2011) (discussing two-sided markets). 
32. See Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167, 
168–69 (1934). 
33. William J. Baumol, Application of Welfare Economics, in A HANDBOOK OF 
CULTURAL ECONOMICS, supra note 31, at 9 (explaining public funding for the arts and 
noting that “[m]uch artistic activity historically has depended on the voluntary patronage of 
royal princes and, later, merchant princes. As democracy took over the world’s wealthier 
economies, government support often replaced that of the patrons.”); see Ruth Towse, 
Opera and Ballet, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS supra note 31, at 314–15 
(discussing subsidies for cultural industries, explaining that many opera houses are “private 
non-profit organizations which are in receipt of a mixture of public subsidy, private patron-
age and sponsorship”).  
34. See Hans Abbing, Poverty and Support for Artists, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL 
ECONOMICS supra note 31, at 344 (reporting that “between one-third and one-half of the 
artists in the West and Australia have overall incomes from work that are at or below the so-
called poverty line or subsistence level . . . . Looking at income from the arts alone instead 
of from work in general, artists earn even less.”); STUART CUNNINGHAM & PETER HIGGS, 
WHAT’S YOUR OTHER JOB? A CENSUS ANALYSIS OF ARTS EMPLOYMENT IN AUSTRALIA 16 
(2010), http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/79074/What_is_ 
your_other_job_the_census_study.pdf (finding that in Australia, in most cases, the percent-
age of part-time employment is much higher in the arts than the workforce average); Bureau 
of Lab. Stat. U.S. Dep’t Lab. Musicians, Singers, and Related Workers, in OCCUPATIONAL 
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 326, 328 (library ed. 2010–11) (“Because many musicians find only 
part-time or intermittent work and experience unemployment between engagements, they 
often supplement their income with other types of jobs.”). 
35. See, e.g., CORY DOCTOROW, Giving It Away, in CONTENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
CREATIVITY, COPYRIGHT, AND THE FUTURE OF THE FUTURE 71 (2008) (explaining Cory 
Doctorow’s decision to release his books for free); Liz Dowthwaite, Getting Paid for Giving 
Away Art for Free: The Case of Webcomics, CREATE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.create. 
ac.uk/blog/2014/02/25/webcomics-dowthwaite/ (discussing cross-subsidies in free online 
webcomics); Mike Masnick, Nina Paley Releases Some Data on ‘Sita Sings the Blues’: The 
More She Shared, the More She Made, TECHDIRT (Aug. 26, 2009, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090824/1723375986.shtml (“[W]here the money comes 
from is the containers. And the containers, for example, are DVDs, merchandise, t-shirts, 35 
mm film prints, physical screenings . . . . The more the content flows freely, the more de-
mand there is for those containers.”); Nine Inch Nails: The Slip, NINE INCH NAILS, 
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In recent decades, the falling costs of production and distribution 
of creative work have led to an explosion in the visibility of ordinary 
or “vernacular” creativity
36
 and an extraordinary blurring of the lines 
between amateurs and professionals
37
 and between users and produc-
ers.
38
 At the same time, free software developers, Wikipedia, and free 
culture artistic projects have shown that new communication tools 
enable widely distributed collaboration between unconnected individ-
uals at a scale never seen before.
39
 It is apparent through these exam-
ples that “commons-based peer-production”
40
 can provide a viable 
model for the large-scale collaborative production of knowledge and 
cultural goods without excluding free-riders. The effect of both of 
these phenomena has been to massively increase the availability of 
copyrighted works produced outside the traditional copyright market 
paradigm in situations where the ability to exclude free-riders is not 
only unnecessary, but is sometimes actively rejected by producers 
interested in encouraging widespread distribution of their works. 
In much of modern copyright discourse, however, all of these ac-
tivities remain at the margins. Wikipedia, as a highly successful and 
widely known crowd-sourced and crowd-funded endeavor, is an outli-
er — an exception to the norm
41
 in the same way that free software is 
an exception to the conventional form of software development.
42
 For 
the core of professional creative production, the dominant assumption 
remains that selling access to copies is required to coordinate and fund 
                                                                                                                  
http://dl.nin.com/theslip/signup (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (“[A]s a thank you to our fans 
for your continued support, we are giving away the new nine inch nails album one hundred 
percent free . . . for those of you interested in physical products, fear not. we [sic] plan to 
make a version of this release available on CD and vinyl.”). 
36. Jean Burgess, Hearing Ordinary Voices: Cultural Studies, Vernacular Creativity, and 
Digital Storytelling, 20 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURE 201, 206–07 (2006) (introduc-
ing the concept of “vernacular creativity” to denote the decentralized and democratized 
production of media by individuals as an ordinary practice of everyday life). 
37. See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 951, 951–57 (2004) (discussing the rise of amateur production). 
38. See AXEL BRUNS, BLOGS, WIKIPEDIA, SECOND LIFE, AND BEYOND: FROM 
PRODUCTION TO PRODUSAGE 9 (2008) (introducing the concept of “produsage”). 
39. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE 
HYBRID ECONOMY 162–72 (2008) (discussing the “sharing economy” beyond Wikipedia). 
40. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 60 (2006) (introducing the term “commons-based 
peer-production” to denote socio-economic production by a network of collaborators who 
share the benefits of their labor and are organized through voluntary and decentralized insti-
tutions, as opposed to traditional hierarchical firm-based or market-based production pro-
cesses). 
41. See Benjamin Mako Hill, Almost Wikipedia: Eight Early Encyclopedia Projects and 
the Mechanisms of Collective Action 2 (Apr. 23, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
M.I.T.), available at http://mako.cc/academic/hill-almost_wikipedia-DRAFT.pdf (explain-
ing that only a small proportion of collaborative production projects online achieve success). 
42. See, e.g., Jürgen Bitzer et al., Intrinsic Motivation in Open Source Software Devel-
opment, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 161 (2007) (recognizing a dichotomy between commercial 
software development and open source development). 
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cultural production.
43
 Because users are often free-riders, in order to 
properly support the production of expensive works of mass culture, it 
is assumed that “a regime of copyright law must supply incentives for 
capital.”
44
 By providing an ostensibly value-neutral method of coordi-
nating cultural production, the copyright market provides a method to 
extract money from consumers without relying on public funds, pri-
vate patrons, or advertisers, each of which can have a harmful dis-
torting effect on the content of the work.
45
 
III. USERS ARE NOT (ALWAYS) FREE-RIDERS 
The mainstream copyright debate generally focuses on why con-
sumers choose to infringe and how free-riding can be deterred. Re-
cently, however, a new narrative about the future of copyright is 
emerging in opposition to copyright’s perceived failure to provide a 
fair deal to both artists and consumers.
46
 The normative underpinnings 
of this new narrative rest on the social benefits of widespread access 
to information,
47
 contrary to the dominant narrative that focuses on 
enabling creators to make a living in the face of mass copying in the 
digital economy. This new narrative asks an interesting question: Why 
do consumers choose to pay, and how can they be encouraged? In this 
producer-centric sense, Techdirt CEO and technology writer Mike 
Masnick has distilled a simplified version of alternate business models 
of producers of creative content into a provoking algorithm: “Connect 
with Fans (CwF) + Reason to Buy (RtB) = The Business Model.”
48
 
Masnick’s core argument is that the focus on free-riders in copyright 
industries is misplaced. Rather than expending energy trying to com-
bat piracy in order to exclude people from accessing goods that are 
                                                                                                                  
43. Cf., Joëlle Farchy, P2P and Piracy: Challenging the Cultural Industries’ Financing 
System, 1 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 55, 66 (2004) (“The free software 
philosophy can never under any circumstances be extended to productions where the fixed 
costs are extremely high (e.g.[,] certain kinds of movies).”). 
44. Cohen, supra note 26, at 149. 
45. NIEL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 81 (2008) (discussing copy-
right’s “structural function,” which “supports a sector of authors and publishers who look to 
the market, not government patronage, for financial sustenance and who thus gain consider-
able independence from government influence”). 
46. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 41 (2010) (ar-
guing that the legislative process used to enact US copyright laws “pays shockingly little 
attention to the reasonable interests of creators or members of their audiences”). 
47. Cf., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copy-
rights in the Digital Age, WIRED (Mar. 1994), available at http://archive.wired.com/ 
wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html (quoting Stewart Brand: “Information Wants To Be 
Free”). See generally Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto (Jan. 2003), 
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/dcm.html (providing an overview of the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the free software movement). 
48. Mike Masnick, The Future of Music Business Models (And Those Who Are Already 
There), TECHDIRT (Jan. 5, 2010, 10:18 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091119/ 
1634117011.shtml. 
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now costless to distribute — like digital music, movies, and books — 
Masnick argues that producers should “set them free” to build atten-
tion and loyal audiences.
49
 Doing this, Masnick argues, will increase 
the value of complementary goods and services that are actually 
scarce, for which producers can much more easily charge a fee.
50
 
Masnick’s argument fits neatly into the narrative of other commenta-
tors like Cory Doctorow and Tim O’Reilly, who have long argued that 
the biggest threat to artists is not piracy, but obscurity.
51
 Chris Ander-
son’s book, Free, then encapsulates the benefits of zero-pricing for 
business and provides a comprehensive survey of business models not 
based on artificial scarcity.
52
 This new narrative offers some hope that 
the crisis in copyright may be overstated,
53
 and that artists and pro-
ducers can flourish in the digital economy. 
A. Pay-What-You-Want Schemes 
Thousands of producers have tested this narrative in practice. 
Across the creative industries and around the world, independent pro-
ducers are combating copyright infringement not through legal en-
forcement, but by giving their audience a reason to pay. PWYW 
models and crowdfunding
54
 campaigns are starting to allow musi-
cians,
55
 comedians,
56
 authors,
57
 documentary and feature filmmak-
ers,
58
 and many more to raise the funds they need without restricting 
                                                                                                                  
49. Id. 
50. Mike Masnick, The Grand Unified Theory on the Economics of Free, TECHDIRT 
(May 3, 2007, 12:23 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070503/012939.shtml. 
51. See DOCTOROW, supra note 35, at 80; Tim O’Reilly, Piracy is Progressive Taxation, 
and Other Thoughts on the Evolution of Online Distribution, OPENP2P.COM (Dec. 11, 
2002), http://openp2p.com/lpt/a/3015. 
52. See CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: HOW TODAY’S SMARTEST BUSINESSES PROFIT BY 
GIVING SOMETHING FOR NOTHING 7 (2009). 
53. See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 
24 (2006) (arguing that copyright industries have used a rhetoric of permanent crisis to 
justify strengthened and more pervasive controls over the flow of information). 
54. Peter Spellman, Crowd Funding: Arts Patronage by the Masses, BERKLEE MUSIC, 
http://www.berklee.edu/bt/194/crowd_funding.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (defining 
crowdfunding as “the act of informally generating and distributing funds, usually online, by 
groups of people for specific social, personal, entertainment-related or other purposes”); see 
also Tim Kappel, Ex Ante Crowdfunding and the Recording Industry: A Model for the 
U.S.?, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 375, 375 (2009). 
55. See, e.g., Greg Kot, Radiohead’s “In Rainbows” Experiment Pays off with 3 Million 
Sales, TURN IT UP (Oct. 20, 2008, 12:10 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20130107045529/http://leisureblogs.chicagotribune.com/turn_it_up/2008/10/radioheads-in-
r.html (accessed through the Internet Archive index); Lipsman, supra note 8. 
56. Cory Doctorow, Louis CK’s DRM-Free Direct-Sales Video Experiment Pays Off, 
BOINGBOING (Dec. 15, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://boingboing.net/2011/12/15/louis-cks-drm-
free-direct-sa.html. 
57. See, e.g., UNGLUE.IT, https://unglue.it/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
58. A number of Creative Commons-licensed films have been successfully funded on the 
crowdsourcing platform Kickstarter. See, e.g., Annie Berman, The Faithful: The King, the 
Pope, the Princess, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/annieberman/the-
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the distribution of their works. Across the range of creative industries, 
a series of experiments by individual artists and producers demon-
strates that consumers will sometimes choose to pay rather than free-
ride.  
Radiohead’s In Rainbows provides not the first, but one of the 
most well-known, tests of PWYW pricing in the creative industries. 
After leaving their record label, Radiohead released a digital down-
load of their next album on their website, allowing consumers to name 
their own price. Whether or not Radiohead’s experiment was a suc-
cess depends largely on the observer’s point of view: to some, the fact 
that a large number of consumers chose to free-ride and pay a price of 
zero showed that the model was deeply flawed.
59
 To others, the fact 
that In Rainbows eventually sold over three million copies in addition 
to the digital downloads, raised significantly greater profits than Ra-
diohead’s previous studio album, debuted on top of the UK and US 
charts, and launched their largest tour to date showed the experiment 
to be a resounding success.
60
 
Since Radiohead’s experiment, many others have adopted 
PWYW business models.
61
 Nine Inch Nails’ openly licensed Ghosts 
I–IV was a spectacular success: Trent Reznor’s industrial rock group 
reported profits of more than $1.6 million from fans who chose to 
purchase copies of the entire album despite having the option to freely 
download the first nine tracks.
62
 The Humble Bundle’s model for 
computer games allows users to specify not only their price, but the 
way the price is split between the game developers, select charities, 
and Humble Bundle, Inc. Each bundle typically attracts several hun-
dred thousand backers, with the average payment often between four 
                                                                                                                  
faithful-the-king-the-pope-the-princess (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Hanna Sköld, Granny’s 
[sic] Dancing on the Table — A Granny-Invasion!, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter. 
com/projects/370814120/grannys-dancing-on-the-table-a-granny-invasion (last visited Dec. 
18, 2014); Frank Weaver, Explore Ancient Rock Art, Experience Guarani Culture!, 
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/frankweaver/explore-ancient-rock-art-
experience-guarani-cultur (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
59. Leah Belsky et al., Everything in Its Right Place: Social Cooperation and Artist 
Compensation, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (noting that many com-
mentators “noted the large percentage of downloaders who paid nothing . . . and concluded 
that music consumers are generally selfish and unwilling to contribute money to finance the 
music they enjoy”). 
60. Id.; Daniel Kreps, Radiohead Publishers Reveal “In Rainbows” Numbers, ROLLING 
STONE (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/radiohead-publishers-
reveal-in-rainbows-numbers-20081015; Eliot Van Buskirk, New In Rainbows Numbers 
Offer Lessons for Music Industry, WIRED (July 31, 2008, 4:11 PM), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20130731050722/http://www.wired.com/listening_post/2008/07/new-in-rainbows/ 
(accessed through the Internet Archive index). 
61. See Ju-Young Kim et al., Pay What You Want: A New Participative Pricing Mecha-
nism, 73 J. MARKETING 44, 45 (2009) (discussing PWYW pricing). 
62. Cheryl Foong, Sharing with Creative Commons: A Business Model for Content Crea-
tors, PLATFORM: J. MEDIA & COMM. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 64, 67 (2010). 
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and ten dollars.
63
 By the end of 2013, Humble’s bundles had raised 
approximately $70 million in revenue,
64
 with $22.5 million going di-
rectly to charities.
65
 Humble’s success has led to the launch of a num-
ber of similar PWYW bundles,
66
 and Humble and others have also 
offered bundles of e-books, stand-up comedy, music, and other digital 
goods. Interestingly, the success of the Humble model shows that 
bundling schemes can provide independent producers easy access to 
distribution and marketing channels like those used by more estab-
lished creators like Radiohead and Nine Inch Nails. The function of 
intermediaries as tastemakers and gatekeepers in providing discovera-
bility is still important to the success of these schemes, but it is being 
undertaken by Humble itself, rather than established media distribu-
tors. Another example is Semaphore Press, founded in 2008, which 
publishes casebooks and makes digital downloads available to stu-
dents on a PWYW scheme, usually with a suggested price of thirty 
dollars.
67
 Semaphore’s data shows that in the fall semester of 2012 
around eighty-three percent of students chose to pay rather than free-
ride, and eighty-seven percent of those students chose to pay the sug-
gested price of $30.
68
  
The evidence amassed from PWYW experiments to date suggests 
that consumers do often pay when they could free-ride.
69
 The next 
Part canvasses some of the reasons why people choose to pay, pre-
senting evidence from anthropology and behavioral economics that 
explains why a substantial proportion of humans across many differ-
ent societies will often choose to cooperate rather than free-ride. 
B. Explaining Altruism in Pay-What-You-Want Schemes 
The rational actor model of classical economic theory suggests 
that people will not pay more than the minimum to get access to a 
                                                                                                                  
63. Humble Bundle, Prior Bundle Statistics, supra note 12. Like many PWYW schemes, 
averages are often somewhat skewed by a handful (often fewer than five) of patrons, usually 
well-known game developers or organizations, who pay thousands of dollars each round. 
64. Id. 
65. Humble Bundle, How Much Has Humble Bundle Raised for Charity?, HUMBLE 
BUNDLE, https://web.archive.org/web/20130909235606/http://support.humblebundle.com/ 
customer/portal/articles/657215-how-much-has-humble-bundle-raised-for-charity- (ac-
cessed through the Internet Archive index) (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (the Humble Bundle 
support page stating “[a]s of August 28, 2013, our customers have given more than $22.5 
million” to charity); John Walker, Interview: Humble Bundle on Humble Bundles, ROCK, 
PAPER, SHOTGUN (Aug. 23, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.rockpapershotgun.com/ 
2013/08/23/interview-humble-bundle-on-humble-bundles/. 
66. See, e.g., INDIE GALA, http://www.indiegala.com/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); 
INDIEROYALE, http://www.indieroyale.com/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
67. About Semaphore Press, SEMAPHORE PRESS, http://semaphorepress.com/ 
about.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
68. Loren, supra note 10, at 13–14. 
69. Belsky et al., supra note 59, at 5. 
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good they value.
70
 In a PWYW scheme, then, a rational consumer 
should choose to pay zero (or the minimum threshold amount), in oth-
er words, to free-ride. The examples above demonstrate that this is not 
the case ― people often voluntarily choose to support cultural pro-
duction by paying when they do not have to. In a pure PWYW 
scheme, choosing to pay more than necessary is altruistic cooperation, 
in the sense that it is not directly or indirectly beneficial for the indi-
vidual.
71
 Clearly, when people pay more than they have to in PWYW 
schemes, they are choosing to pay that extra amount for reasons other 
than personal wealth maximization. 
Why would people choose not to free-ride? The answer is that 
homo economicus, the simple model of humans as rational, self-
interested wealth-maximizers, is inaccurate.
72
 Decisions about wheth-
er and how much to pay are influenced by regard for others and social 
conceptions of fairness and reciprocity.
73
 One compelling explanation 
for cooperation is simply that “[r]eciprocity is a basic norm taught in 
all societies”:
74
 People will often punish transgression and reward 
kindness with kindness.
75
 A mass of anthropological evidence demon-
strates that people are generally cooperative social animals.
76
 The im-
pulse to cooperate, reward kindness, and punish free-riding seems to 
                                                                                                                  
70. See Lawrence E. Blume & David Easley, Rationality, THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_ 
R000277 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
71. See S.A. West et al., Social Semantics: Altruism, Cooperation, Mutualism, Strong 
Reciprocity and Group Selection, 20 J. EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 415, 419 (2007) (defining 
altruistic cooperation). 
72. See Herbert Gintis, Beyond Homo Economicus: Evidence from Experimental Eco-
nomics, 35 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 311, 320 (2000) (arguing that “[t]he economist’s treatment 
of rationality . . . cannot be supported.”); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Homo 
Reciprocans, 415 NATURE 125, 127 (2002) (explaining that individuals use “altruistic pun-
ishment,” from which they derive no personal benefit, in order to discourage others from 
free-riding). 
73. See generally Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, The Economics of Fairness, Reciproc-
ity and Altruism — Experimental Evidence and New Theories, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 615, 617 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & 
Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006) (“This [large body of] evidence indicates that a substantial 
percentage of the people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences and that 
concerns for the well-being of others, for fairness and for reciprocity, cannot be ignored in 
social interactions.”); Iris Bohnet, Experiments, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY 639, 649 (Peter Hedström & Peter Bearman eds., 2009); Martin 
A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773, 1773 
(2000). 
74. Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice 
Theory of Collective Action, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association 
(1997), in 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 10 (1998). 
75. See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, A COOPERATIVE SPECIES: HUMAN 
RECIPROCITY AND ITS EVOLUTION 20 (2011) (“In experiments we commonly observe that 
people sacrifice their own payoffs in order to cooperate with others, to reward the coopera-
tion of others, and to punish free-riding, even when they cannot expect to gain from acting 
this way.”). See generally Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 
425 NATURE 785 (2003). 
76. See BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 75, at 6–7. 
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have strong evolutionary roots: our ancestors, living in small bands, 
had to cooperate to survive.
77
 Social norms of fairness are expressed 
and reinforced through this cycle of rewarding cooperators and sham-
ing and shunning free-riders. In evolutionary biology, this is termed 
“strong reciprocity,”
78
 to distinguish it from cases of “direct reciproci-
ty,” where a favor is likely to be repaid (and cooperation is therefore 
directly beneficial to the individual).
79
 
As a rough baseline, behavioral experiments exploring reciprocity 
in laboratory settings have consistently found that about half of people 
tested are “conditional cooperators” who are “willing to contribute 
more to a public good the more others contribute.”
80
 The rational ac-
tor model predicts that in experiments designed to model contribu-
tions to public goods, where cooperation increases the rewards to 
everyone but leaves the participant personally worse off, rational par-
ticipants will always choose to free-ride. In reality, participants often 
choose to cooperate.
81
 Other experiments show that people are willing 
to increase their contribution when others cooperate more as well.82 
When they have the opportunity to do so, people are also willing to 
incur personal costs to punish individuals who appear to be unfairly 
taking advantage of others.
83
 Most of these people will withdraw their 
cooperation if they do not believe that others will also cooperate — 
                                                                                                                  
77. See CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, MORAL ORIGINS: THE EVOLUTION OF VIRTUE, 
ALTRUISM, AND SHAME 10–11 (2012); BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 75, at 50 
(“[C]ooperative groups tend to prevail in the frequent inter-group competition and to sur-
vive the severe environmental crises that . . . characterized the early human condition.”). 
78. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the 
Enforcement of Social Norms, 13 HUM. NATURE 1, 3 (2002) (characterizing strong reciproc-
ity as willingness to sacrifice resources either to reward kindness or punish unkindness in 
others “even if this is costly and provides neither present nor future material rewards for the 
reciprocator”). 
79. See West et al., supra note 71, at 421. 
80. Urs Fischbacher et al., Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Pub-
lic Goods Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397, 397 (2001); Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, 
Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social 
Scientists, in FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND 
ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES 55, 66 (Joseph 
Henrich, et al. eds., 2004); Rachel T.A. Croson, Theories of Commitment, Altruism and 
Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 199, 200 
(2007) (finding that people often contribute an amount that approximates the median or 
average of the contributions they know or believe others to contribute); Fehr & Gintis, supra 
note 15, at 50–51 (presenting a synthesis of the literature on behavioral experiments of 
cooperation and concluding that “the vast majority of subjects can be classified either as 
purely self-regarding or as conditionally cooperative”). 
81. See Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: 
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 307 (1981). 
82. See Camerer & Fehr, supra note 80, at 75–76. 
83. See id. at 68; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 
NATURE 137, 137 (2002) (finding that in experiments, people punish free-riders if they are 
able to, even when it is not directly in their best interests). 
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nobody likes to be a “sucker.”
84
 The same experiments demonstrate 
that another group — perhaps one third of all participants — will still 
act as predicted by a model of rational wealth maximization and will 
almost always free-ride given the choice.
85
 
Basic PWYW schemes can often be successful by appealing to 
the cooperative nature of humans, even if only half of those who re-
spond choose to cooperate. While a proportion of users will always 
free-ride, if a sufficient number of conditional cooperators can be per-
suaded to contribute, producers are able to recoup their investment 
(and profit) in the absence of any means to exclude the free-riders. 
The rate at which conditional cooperators choose to participate is 
strongly affected by their evaluation of the likelihood that others will 
also cooperate. Social measures of fairness and esteem, the warm 
glow of helping others, a desire to reciprocate, and ethical commit-
ments also may affect this participation rate. In the following sections, 
I demonstrate how each of these factors contributes to consumer deci-
sions to cooperate in voluntary payment schemes for creative works. 
1. Fairness and Esteem 
Generally speaking, humans care strongly about how they per-
ceive themselves and how others will perceive them.
86
 They will, ac-
cordingly, act in ways that are considered to be right, in accordance 
with social norms. A large body of behavioral evidence shows that, 
against their direct self-interest, people make offers that are fair and 
reject offers that are manifestly unfair.
87
 These experiments have 
found that people who express both a personal commitment to fair-
ness and a concept of fairness that encourages cooperation are often 
willing to pay more in PWYW schemes.
88
 For a small proportion of 
patrons, the shame of not paying also seems to play a large role in 
their decisions to pay.
89
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(Jena Econ. Res. Paper No. 2010-081, 2010) (reporting that in a PWYW music model, 
“[g]uilt seems to have the strongest effect on behaviour . . . but it applies only to a few peo-
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154  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 28 
 
 
The moral requirements of fairness are under constant active con-
struction in PWYW schemes. The way a campaign is framed will 
likely have a strong effect on what people consider fair and are will-
ing to pay.
90
 Many people believe that artists deserve to be paid for 
their work, and creative goods tend to have well-established reference 
prices — the standard price of a CD, for example, sets a benchmark 
for what might be considered fair. Generally speaking, PWYW pa-
trons disproportionately choose to pay at the default or suggested ref-
erence price.
91
 In some cases, producers set a default price supported 
by an explanation of their costs and a normative justification of a fair 
return.
92
 As might be expected, PWYW schemes are rich with discus-
sions of how to value a particular product. Sometimes participants 
attempt to derive a figure based on hours of enjoyment, as measured 
against some external measure of value, such as a two-hour film.
93 
Other time-based value scales are much more subjective and opaque, 
like this example from a purchaser of independent game developer 2D 
Boy’s PWYW offering, World of Goo: “I’ll either be bored of it with-
in 10 minutes, in which case $1 is fair, or I’ll really love it, in which 
case I’ll buy it again for $20.”
94
  
Importantly, however, counter-arguments exist in favor of free-
riding, and individual participants sometimes justify their decisions to 
free-ride on a variety of factors. One of the most common counter-
arguments proceeds on the basis that consumers may not have paid for 
                                                                                                                  
90. See, e.g., Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputa-
tions Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1177 (2004) (finding that in otherwise identical 
games, labeling an experiment as a “Community Game” led participants to expect more 
cooperation from others (and also to reciprocate by cooperating in turn) more often than 
when the experiment was framed as a “Wall Street Game”). 
91. Regner, supra note 89, at 20–21; see also Belsky et al., supra note 59, at 33. It is not 
wholly clear, however, whether consumers prefer the default because the reference price is 
considered to be the right price to pay or because it is simply the easier option avoiding the 
more difficult mental calculation cost. See Klaus M. Schmidt et al., Pay What You Want as 
a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets, MGMT. SCI. 14 (article in 
advance Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/ 
mnsc.2014.1946. 
92. See, e.g., Matthias Greiff et al., Pay What You Want — But Pay Enough! Information 
Asymmetries and PWYW-Pricing 5 (Joint Discussion Paper Series in Econ. No. 04-2013, 
Jan. 2013) (noting the strong influence of transparency (or otherwise) of the creator’s pro-
duction costs on consumers’ willingness to pay under PWYW conditions). 
93. See, e.g., FistsOfTinsel, Comment to World of Goo “Pay What You Want” Sale a 
“Huge Success,” THE ESCAPIST FORUMS (Oct. 21, 2009, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.escapistmagazine.com/forums/read/7.150951-World-of-Goo-Pay-What-You-
Want-Sale-a-Huge-Success#3558487 (addressing the perceived large number of people who 
chose to pay very little for World of Goo: “[S]houldn’t you really be basing the amount you 
pay against what you’d pay for other forms of entertainment, and compare it to the number 
of hours you’d get out of Goo? You could even divide that result and still get a lot more 
than a penny.”). 
94. A potential player, Comment to Pay-What-You-Want Birthday Sale Results, 2D BOY 
(Oct. 21, 2009, 1:13 AM), http://2dboy.com/2009/10/19/birthday-sale-results//#comment-
16469. 
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access anyway, which means not every free-rider is a lost sale that 
imposes harm on the producer. Another commenter on World of 
Goo’s results typifies the sentiment: “Yeah, people paying some low 
amount seems bad, but a lot of those folks wouldn’t have bought it 
otherwise. So [the game producer] still end up ahead.”
95
 Other discus-
sions focus around the ability of people to pay. Participants often ex-
plain their decisions to underpay based on their personal financial 
circumstances, while others frequently criticize those justifications as 
selfish.
96
 These norms are under constant construction by participants 
in discussions around PWYW schemes. 
While it has not been extensively empirically verified, there is a 
strong suggestion that PWYW works best when producers can devel-
op strong personal links with their audiences.
97
 The extent to which 
people care about what others think of them depends on their relation-
ship to those other people.
98
 Fans, for example, might be strongly mo-
tivated to support their favorite artists, with whom they feel a special 
connection. Conversely, when they do not trust the motives or behav-
ior of the producer, people are more likely to pay less and pay less 
often.
99
 This leads to two common and related post-hoc justifications 
for a person’s choice to infringe rather than pay for access to enter-
tainment goods: a single lost sale means little to large corporations 
and, since individual artists are notoriously unfairly treated by pub-
lishers,
100
 a single lost sale means even less to the artists. This intui-
tion is reinforced quite commonly in the discourse around PWYW. 
Mikolaj Kaminski, an independent game designer known by the name 
Sos Sosowski, explains how he tried to personalize himself to his au-
dience: “I think that if people who torrent the game are aware that 
                                                                                                                  
95. NKDietrich, Comment to Pay-What-You-Want Game Sale Results, [H]ARD|FORUM 3 
(Oct. 22, 2009, 5:44 AM), http://hardforum.com/showpost.php?p=1034795723& 
postcount=46. 
96. This issue was heavily debated in the data. Compare hypes057, Comment to Pay-
What-You-Want Birthday Sale Results, 2D BOY (Oct. 20, 2009, 9:30 AM), 
http://2dboy.com/2009/10/19/birthday-sale-results/#comment-16427 (“I bought the game 
for a mere $1, I feel real bad about that guys. . . . I like the game and if you give the option 
to donate more after this I will when I get some more funds!”), with FistsOfTinsel, supra 
note 93. 
97. See Vincent Mak et al., “Pay What You Want” as Threshold Public Good Provision 
38–39 (Cambridge Judge Business School, Working Paper No. 3/2014, June 26, 2014) 
(arguing that the conditions for threshold public good provision are likely to be met for 
independent bands with loyal followings, amongst others). 
98. See Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of 
Incentive Theory, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 990, 992 (2008) (proposing a model of behavior 
based on social esteem). 
99. Francisco J. León et al., How Much Would You Like To Pay? Trust, Reciprocity and 
Prosocial Motivations in El Trato, 51 SOC. SCI. INFO. 389, 409 (2012) (suggesting that 
people will pay less when they detect ulterior motives for actions). 
100. See Belsky et al., supra note 59, at 13 (arguing that “the overwhelming majority of 
album releases net no revenue for the individual artist, and it is common for artists to wind 
up owing money to the record label for un-recouped recording and promotion costs”). 
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there is a live person behind the game, and makes the game for a liv-
ing, they are more willing to provide support than to a giant lifeless 
studio.”
101
 
The responses to Kaminski’s experiment often reinforce the im-
portance of supporting independent artists. Consumers of independent 
games tend to view independent producers as more authentic artists, 
who create out of love — as opposed to the perceived greed of corpo-
rate producers. As such, some members of the community view inde-
pendent developers as morally worthy of support in a way that large 
corporations are not.
102
 Importantly, commentators hotly contest this 
point — reinforcing an imperative against stealing and rejecting justi-
fications for free-riding as selfish: “If you can’t afford it, maybe 
[you’re] not entitled to it.”
103
 Ultimately, however, because large la-
bels can reach a much wider audience, they can often raise much more 
absolute revenue even if they have lower rates of participation. 
The way participation is socially constructed also feeds into the 
warm glow that people receive from choosing to cooperate.
104
 People 
often like to be recognized as generous or as being tastemakers,
105
 and 
many crowdfunding and PWYW projects exploit these desires by 
providing status rewards for various levels of support. For example, 
the Humble Bundle
106
 prominently lists top contributors along with 
the amount they pledged. In many other crowdfunding campaigns, 
pledging over a threshold might earn a patron a line in the credits of a 
film, game, book, or recording; a distinguishing avatar in an online 
forum or computer game; backstage access a performance; and so on. 
The strength of this type of warm glow is hard to measure, but it is 
likely to be important to some backers. 
                                                                                                                  
101. Kyle Orland, How One Game Developer Is Making the Pirate Bay Work for Him, 
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 7, 2012, 7:00 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2012/09/how-
one-game-developer-is-making-the-pirate-bay-work-for-him/. 
102. Sertigo, Comment to These [sic] Kind of Developers Truly Deserve Recognition., 
REDDIT (2012), http://www.reddit.com/r/gaming/comments/ydbdk/these_kind_of_ 
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REDDIT (2012), http://www.reddit.com/r/gaming/comments/ydbdk/these_kind_of_ 
developers_truly_deserve_recognition/ (on file with author). 
104. See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of 
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464 (1990) (discussing the warm glow that individu-
als may receive from charitable behavior and the effect of social pressure and personal 
preferences in motivating decisions to contribute to public goods). 
105. See HELEN KLAEBE & REBECCA LAYCOCK, HOW TO WORK THE CROWD: A 
SNAPSHOT OF BARRIERS AND MOTIVATIONS TO CROWDFUNDING 7 (2012) (stating that 
donors contribute to crowdfunding campaigns to “connect[] to, the ‘new hot.’ This motiva-
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INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 81 (2011) (“Credible signalling [sic] builds reputa-
tion, and reputation is social capital . . . .”). 
106. HUMBLE BUNDLE, https://www.humblebundle.com/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
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2. Other-Regarding Norms 
In addition to wanting to cooperate and wanting to be seen to co-
operate, people also care about the welfare of others. In behavioral 
experiments, cooperation increases when more is at stake — partici-
pants apparently rise to the occasion when the group stands to gain a 
lot from working together.
107
 This implies that, contrary to the predic-
tions of the rational actor model, “many people are positively 
weighting the outcomes of others.”
108
 People who give to others de-
rive personal satisfaction from the act of helping or from “making a 
difference.”
109
 An emerging strain of neuroscience experiments sug-
gests that this has a biological component: rewards received by others 
activate the same neural circuitry as rewards received by oneself.
110
 
Evidence from behavioral economics suggests that consumers will 
sometimes purchase more often and pay more under a PWYW 
scheme with a charitable component than either a fixed-price scheme 
or a PWYW scheme without a charitable component.
111
 This insight 
has been leveraged by PWYW sites to increase both number of pur-
chases and profit. The Humble Bundle, for example, prominently 
stresses that a portion of the money participants choose to pay goes by 
default to a recognized charity (typically 10–30%).
112
 Participants are 
also given the agency to redirect any proportion of their purchase 
price to charity and are sometimes allowed to elect a split among sev-
eral charities. 
3. Reciprocity 
Consumers who pay more than required in PWYW schemes are 
often motivated to reward what they see as kindness in producers. 
When given a good for free that is normally costly and then subse-
                                                                                                                  
107. See David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-
Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58, 79 (1995). 
108. Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 
183, 200 (1998). 
109. See Brian Duncan, A Theory of Impact Philanthropy, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2159, 2176 
(2004). 
110. See Ernst Fehr & Colin F. Camerer, Social Neuroeconomics: The Neural Circuitry 
of Social Preferences, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 419, 425 (2007) (providing a review 
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& Martin Holmén, Charity, Incentives, and Performance 16–17 (Nov. 1, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205622 (find-
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(Humble Bundle’s front page has prominent links saying “Pay what you want” and “Support 
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quently given an option to pay, studies show that consumers are ap-
parently often motivated to repay the generosity of the artist or pro-
ducer. A survey of people who voluntarily gave money to purchase 
access to music under a PWYW model found that a portion of cus-
tomers explicitly acknowledged the kind behavior of the producer in 
making music abundantly available on a try-before-you-buy model, 
and these customers reciprocated by paying more than those with oth-
er motivations.
113
 The same phenomenon can be observed in other 
voluntary schemes. For example, after an illicit torrent of the inde-
pendent game McPixel became widespread, the game’s designer, 
Mikolaj Kaminski, endorsed the torrent with a PWYW plea for dona-
tions.
114
 Kaminski explicitly framed his actions as a personal gift from 
an independent developer who understands that not everyone can af-
ford to pay for games.
115
 The responses to Kaminski’s experiment 
sometimes (but not often) explicitly reflected a sense of reciprocity: 
because he encouraged people to download the game for free, Kamin-
ski deserved to be rewarded.
116
 Interestingly, in the McPixel experi-
ment, the developer explicitly constructed reciprocity as a cycle, 
where payment by audience members imposed continuing obligations 
of respect and customer service: “If someone gives me money, I feel 
obliged to treat him with due respect, especially when it comes for 
[sic] something he pays for!”
117
 
4. Commitment 
Finally, people sometimes cooperate on moral grounds. A person 
who knows that the optimal result of a public goods dilemma is for 
each person to cooperate may choose to follow an internal rule to co-
                                                                                                                  
113. See Regner, supra note 89, at 12, 20. 
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115. Sosowski, Comment to I Am Sos, Who Made McPixel and Gave out Free Codes on 
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developers_truly_deserve_recognition/c5umbd9/. 
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operate in those situations.
118
 Economic theorist Amartya Sen has 
forcefully argued that the theory of rational choice should be expand-
ed to include this type of commitment, which is no less rational even 
if it is not purely self-interested.
119
 Many people believe that paying 
for copyrighted content is the right thing to do, and consumers often 
prefer to pay rather than free-ride, if given the choice.
120
 In the 
PWYW experiments studied, explicit justifications of this type are 
less common than others, but there are certainly people who explain 
that they are motivated to pay because they support the concept or 
idea of PWYW models: “This is the future of e-goods commerce, and 
also the solution for a better world; greed makes more greed, selfless-
ness is just awesome.”
121 
The disintermediation of creative industries may play a particular-
ly strong role in the commitment that people feel to pay. Public con-
sciousness caricatures large publisher intermediaries as untrustworthy, 
greedy, faceless corporations. The emergence of new, apparently fair-
er models of distributing creative works may engender greater levels 
of support for independent producers amongst those who have grown 
dissatisfied with existing copyright business models.
122
  
C. Summary: A Better Model of the Copyright Consumer 
The success of a wide variety of PWYW schemes, although they 
form only a minority of market transactions, suggests that conven-
tional accounts of copyright are incomplete. Ultimately, decisions to 
pay are socially constructed, and no single explanation exists for why 
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people choose to cooperate rather than free-ride.
123
 The reasons indi-
viduals cooperate are highly varied,
124
 and it may be difficult to dif-
ferentiate between self-interested and altruistic cooperation in real 
world settings.
125
 What we do know is that human beings are complex 
social creatures, and their actions are influenced by social norms.
126
 
They are also self-interested and will often respond to incentives. Put 
simply, individuals like to do what they consider to be right, and they 
like to do what is best for themselves.
127
 Whether a given individual 
will cooperate is a function of their own self-interest, their trust that 
others will reciprocate, and the complex patterns of social norms that 
structure and construct their interaction.
128
 It is apparent then that the 
model of the consumer as a rational actor that underpins copyright 
law, a user who “is trying to get away with paying less than the mar-
ket price for a particular cultural good,”
129
 is misguided. This rational 
economic model of the user captures only the self-interested motiva-
tions of audiences and ignores the messy social factors that underlie 
decision-making.
130
 Understanding the motivations of consumers re-
quires understanding both the incentives presented to individuals and 
the norms of the group. 
IV. EXPLICITLY INTRODUCING FAIRNESS TO COPYRIGHT 
Because current copyright business models ignore the role of rec-
iprocity and fairness, the models undermine the legitimacy of copy-
right law and likely increase rates of free-riding and infringement.
131
 
Standard discussions about copyright reform focus on deterring in-
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fringement through legal penalties and increasing the efficiency of 
copyright markets.
132
 These discussions treat social norms, not as an 
integral determinant of free-riding, but as a mere reflection of behav-
ior to be changed through the operation of law. Because legal penal-
ties are rare, most recent law reform debate has focused on increasing 
the severity
133
 and regularity of punishments.
134
 The problem is that, 
for the portion of users who do fundamentally want to support pro-
ducers, an increasingly punitive copyright system is likely to be seen 
as unfair and may thereby increase their willingness to free-ride. The 
reputation the music industry has acquired for exploiting artists
135
 has 
already greatly reduced the perceived fairness of copyright business 
models, and increasing the strength of copyright laws further discon-
nects the law from practice and social norms.
136
 At the same time, the 
intermediated, transactional nature of digital copyright markets reduc-
es the link between authors and their audiences and likely further di-
minishes consumer desire to pay.
137
 The copyright industries have 
attempted to shift social norms back in their favor, but their attempts 
have been somewhat clumsy to date.
138
 No wonder then that users 
often infringe copyright: as the fairness norm around paying for ac-
cess weakens, people will more often act as rational actors. Since the 
likelihood of getting caught is still minuscule, free-riding is often the 
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Teenage Kicks or Virtual Villainy? Internet Piracy, Moral Entrepreneurship, and the Social 
Construction of a Crime Problem, in CRIME ONLINE 95, 96 (Yvonne Jewkes ed., 2013) 
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rational choice. If copyright law is to be respected and followed, it 
must reflect a fair social bargain. For copyright policy and industry 
practice, this likely means less stick and more carrot: focusing less on 
increasing the deterring effect of copyright law through harsher and 
more regular enforcement and instead encouraging the non-economic 
social motivations of audiences to support cultural production. 
Some producers in the creative industries have developed a fuller 
understanding of the mix of these motivations and have experimented 
with methods of inculcating and supporting prosocial norms amongst 
their audiences. The rise of crowdfunding provides an excellent ex-
ample. Producers who run successful crowdfunding campaigns usual-
ly have strong networks of fans who fundamentally want to support 
them
139
 and incentives in the form of exclusive rewards or value-
added goods and services. Since the launch of Kickstarter, 
crowdfunding has rapidly become extremely popular.
140
 Producers 
who are able to create strong connections with their fans greatly re-
duce their risk and cost of borrowing and thereby increase their ex-
pected profits.
141 
The art of both providing incentives and supporting reciprocal 
norms is being learned rapidly, as techniques are refined in experi-
ments all across the creative industries. Highly successful designs in 
PWYW schemes generally achieve three things: they provide attrac-
tive private incentives, they craft social norms that enhance coopera-
tive motives, and they manage to balance the two forces so that 
private incentives do not crowd out generosity by making cooperators 
feel like suckers. Belsky, et al., provide a preliminary list of design 
choices that might be applied in PWYW models to encourage pay-
ment including:
142
 focusing on developing personal connections with 
consumers; demonstrating trustworthiness, authenticity, and transpar-
ency; developing a sense of fairness, moral obligation, and a social 
norm of cooperation; providing autonomy; crafting the right mix of 
rewards and (less commonly) punishments; and leveraging social 
networks. Distributors like Humble Bundle and producers using 
crowdfunding sites like Kickstarter are quickly building expertise in 
combining these techniques to maximize their revenue. 
Take, for example, independent game developer Double Fine’s 
crowdfunding campaign for a recently released game, Broken Age. 
Double Fine, led by the legendary game designer Tim Schafer, built 
                                                                                                                  
139. See Ajay Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding, in 14 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 63, 85 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2013). 
140. See One Billion Dollars, KICKSTARTER (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://www.kickstarter.com/1billion (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (stating that by March 3, 
2014, Kickstarter had raised over $1 billion in pledges by 5.7 million people). 
141. See Agrawal et al., supra note 139, at 70 (arguing that crowdfunding provides artists 
with “a lower cost of capital, and . . . access to more information”). 
142. Belsky et al., supra note 59, at 51. 
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on its established reputation and asked the crowd to fund the produc-
tion of a new adventure game. In the largest successful Kickstarter 
campaign at the time, Double Fine raised $3.3 million, well above its 
$400,000 goal.
143
 The final game was made available to early backers 
at a discounted price of $15
144
 and opened in wider retail to the rest of 
the world for $24.99.
145
 Through crowdfunding, Double Fine was able 
to finance an independently produced videogame that apparently 
would not have been possible to fund through a conventional publish-
er.
146
 Double Fine was able to substantially reduce its risk profile by 
securing funds in advance through preorders and cross-subsidies; it 
was then able to supplement this with its own or borrowed funds if 
necessary, at a greatly reduced risk. Consumers benefited by getting 
early access to a new game at a discounted price. Potentially, although 
it is hard to evaluate, the game might also be judged to be better under 
these conditions ― the developer might be able to take more creative 
risks and deliver a more polished product without the pressures and 
constraints that publishers bring to game development.147 Double Fi-
ne’s engagement with their audience provides a key example of how 
producers are able to develop mutually beneficial relationships with 
customers that develop real enthusiasm for backers to pay. 
This increased understanding of cooperative norms shows sub-
stantial promise for producers in the creative industries who have long 
been worried about rates of free-riding. Part of the attraction of these 
models is that they provide endogenous price discrimination
148
 — by 
allowing consumers to select their own price points, they are able to 
satisfy more consumer demand and potentially capture more consum-
er surplus than if producers had to pick a single price. The real beauty 
of these models, though, is that they put fairness at the heart of pur-
                                                                                                                  
143. See Patrick Shaw, Double Fine Adventure Kickstarter Nets $3.3M, WIRED (Mar. 14, 
2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2012/03/double-fine-adventure/. 
144. Double Fine & 2 Player Productions, Double Fine Adventure, KICKSTARTER, 
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/doublefine/double-fine-adventure (last visited Dec. 18, 
2014). 
145. Buy Broken Age, BROKEN AGE, http://www.brokenagegame.com/buy/ (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2014). 
146. See Double Fine Adventure, KICKSTARTER, supra note 144 (in a promotional video, 
co-creator Tim Schafer explained he was seeking funding through Kickstarter because “if 
[he] were to go to a publisher right now and pitch an adventure game, they’d laugh in [his] 
face.”). 
147. See Robin Potanin, Forces in Play: The Business and Culture of Videogame Pro-
duction, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INT’L CONFERENCE ON FUN AND GAMES 135, 136–37 
(2010) (describing pressures on developers from publishers in the games industry, and argu-
ing that “[e]conomics does not encourage diversity in the games industry”). See generally 
Mia Consalvo, Crunched by Passion: Women Game Developers and Workplace Challenges, 
in BEYOND BARBIE AND MORTAL KOMBAT 177, 182–85 (Yasmin B. Kafai et al., eds., 2008) 
(discussing pressures faced by game developers). 
148. See R. Mark Isaac et al., The Pay-What-You-Like Business Model: Warm Glow 
Revenues and Endogenous Price Discrimination 3 (May 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1612951. 
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chasing decisions.
149
 One of the key threats to the legitimacy of copy-
right law is the large gap between law and practice.150 Licensing prac-
tices are one of the key drivers of this gap: when consumers do not 
accept unilateral licensing decisions as a fair bargain, they will often 
turn to illicit channels to access copyrighted goods.
151
 In this case, 
combating infringement by continuing to increase the punitive force 
of copyright law may ultimately be counterproductive, since the gap 
between law and norms will only increase. From the perspective of 
copyright policy, if voluntary payment models are able to provide 
sufficiently strong economic incentives and social rewards for pay-
ment, they might be able to achieve normative legitimacy in a way 
that other copyright business models have not been able to. 
This movement is well under way. While industry lobby groups 
are still committed to strengthening copyright domestically152 and 
abroad,
153
 business practice and copyright reform processes are also 
starting to converge on limiting free-riding by satisfying consumer 
demands through appropriate pricing
154
 and establishing more effi-
cient markets for rights clearances.155 The teleology of digital busi-
ness models in mainstream thought continues to point towards a 
“celestial jukebox”
156
 model of content distribution,157 embodied in 
the app stores, digital music stores, and streaming music and video 
services that enable unprecedented access to the copyright market for 
                                                                                                                  
149. It is important to note that many conventional copyright licensing transactions cer-
tainly do leverage reciprocity and fairness norms, just not as explicitly. Id. at 19 (“consum-
ers’ warm glow values are built in to the posted price calculations, and many are purchasing 
a product for far more than their intrinsic valuation for it”). 
150. See John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm 
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537 (2007). 
151. See Dootson & Suzor, supra note 17, at 20 (reporting that where rightsholders and 
distributors adopt profit-maximizing strategies that create unmet demand in the market — 
including exclusive licensing practices, high pricing, and low availability — consumers are 
more willing to infringe copyright). 
152. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” 
Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 30–33 
(2012) (discussing the recently introduced “copyright alert system”). 
153. See Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 106–08 (2012). 
154. See Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
1, 66 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (noting a shift in industry practice towards recognizing 
piracy as unmet consumer demand). 
155. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 132, at 30 (discussing copyright licensing and 
recommending the establishment of a Digital Copyright Exchange: “It is widely acknowl-
edged that the solution to these difficulties lies in the very technologies that created the 
problem. Just as digital technologies provide new and exciting ways of using content, they 
offer a means of transforming the efficiency of licensing . . . . ‘[T]he answer to the machine 
is in the machine.’”). 
156. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO 
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (2003) (introducing the term “celestial jukebox”). 
157. See Nicolas Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copy-
right, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 297, 313–14 (2013). 
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both consumers and producers.
158
 As these forces converge, the arc of 
copyright seems to be headed inexorably towards this vision of a per-
fect copyright market — fair and convenient enough to be respected, 
but strong enough to be feared.
159 
V. “PEACEFUL REVOLUTIONS” 
While the use of reciprocity norms is key to increasing the effica-
cy of current digital distribution models, perfecting the celestial juke-
box may not be the best end goal for copyright. It has long been 
thought that copyright, which provides a property right to exclude 
free-riders, is the “least objectionable” means of remunerating crea-
tors and publishers.
160
 The fact that consumers will often voluntarily 
choose to support creative production indicates that we should seri-
ously reconsider this assumption. In this Part, I suggest that not only 
are cooperative systems of coordinating cultural production possible, 
but where they are effective, they are likely to be better than conven-
tional copyright systems. 
In game theory terms, the decision of individuals to free-ride or to 
pay for the production of cultural goods is thought of in terms of a 
prisoner’s dilemma,
161
 where the dominant strategy is always to “de-
fect” or free-ride.
162
 There are two fundamental flaws with this justifi-
cation for copyright. The first is that cultural production does not have 
to be a prisoner’s dilemma.
163
 The tragedy of the commons is a pris-
oner’s dilemma because free-riders end up destroying the pasture 
through overuse.
164
 But since information is non-rival and non-
                                                                                                                  
158. See generally Ben Goldsmith, The Smartphone App Economy and App Ecosystems, 
in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO MOBILE MEDIA 171 (Gerard Goggin & Larissa Hjorth 
eds., 2014), available at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/65633/ (describing growth in the apps 
industry aligned with increase in smartphone and tablet use). 
159. Suzor, supra note 157, at 301–02. 
160. See Macaulay, supra note 24, at 6 (“It is desirable that we should have a supply of 
good books: we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally remunerated; 
and the least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of copyright.”). 
161. In informal terms, a prisoner’s dilemma is a thought experiment in game theory 
wherein the parties would cumulatively be better off cooperating, but each has a strong 
individual incentive to defect, independently of whether the other cooperates or not. For a 
formal description, see Anatol Rapoport & Albert M. Chammah, PRISONER’S DILEMMA: A 
STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 33–36 (1965) (describing the structure of a prison-
er’s dilemma). 
162. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 869 (1992) (arguing that “[i]f creation is 
expensive, if access is often easy and copying is usually cheap, and if there are competing 
creators and copyists, this combination of features is likely to lead to a prisoner’s dilemma 
situation in which legal rights may be required to encourage productive behavior”). See 
generally Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners’ Dilemma, 16 
BEHAV. SCI. 472 (1971) (modeling collective action as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma). 
163. See Kollock, supra note 108, at 189–90 (noting the “common misunderstanding” of 
assuming that public goods games are all prisoner’s dilemmas). 
164. Hardin, supra note 28, at 1244. 
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exhaustible,
165
 while free-riders do not contribute towards the costs of 
production, they do not actually harm others.
166
 It is accordingly pos-
sible to design schemes where being a sucker by cooperating when 
others do not is not the worst outcome. 
The second flaw in the conventional story, as shown in Part III, is 
that even when cultural production is a prisoner’s dilemma, users do 
not in fact always free-ride in the way that classical economic theory 
predicts. The abstraction of the prisoner’s dilemma relies on an arti-
fice that the prisoners cannot communicate — or will not trust each 
other if they can.
167
 In fact, humans have long overcome cooperative 
dilemmas through communication.
168
 The mere ability to talk en-
hances cooperation,
169
 allowing participants to build trust by obtaining 
some form of (unenforceable) social assurances that others will coop-
erate.
170
 By communicating, participants are also able to construct 
fairness norms amongst themselves — including esteem, guilt, shame, 
and reciprocal social rewards for cooperation.
171
 More formally, by 
working together, humans can also develop cooperative institutions 
that develop, monitor, and enforce social norms to increase trust and 
limit free-riding.
172
 
These two points challenge the economic raison d’être of copy-
right law. They imply that it might be possible to use both incentives 
and reciprocity norms to design alternate systems that can support 
routine cultural production without excluding free-riders. To the ex-
tent that this is true, there is a good chance that cooperative systems 
are likely to provide better outcomes than conventional copyright sys-
tems. Take, for example, musician Amanda Palmer’s album, Theatre 
is Evil, which Palmer self-released in 2012 after raising more than 
$1.19 million in what was, at the time, the most successful music 
                                                                                                                  
165. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
166. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1049 (“If the marginal social cost of benefiting from a 
use is zero, prohibiting that use imposes unnecessary social costs.”). 
167. Sally, supra note 107, at 59–60. 
168. Id. at 78 (describing a metastudy of 130 experiments of prisoner’s dilemma games 
involving over 5000 participants, and concluding that communication increases rates of 
cooperation by approximately forty percent).  
169. Ostrom, supra note 74, at 9 (“[C]onsistent, strong, and replicable findings are that 
substantial increases in the levels of cooperation are achieved when individuals are allowed 
to communicate face to face.”). 
170. See generally Tore Ellingsen & Robert Östling, When Does Communication Im-
prove Coordination?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1695 (2010) (providing a model that predicts 
that communication is likely to increase cooperation in certain games, at least where there is 
no strong temptation for participants to deceive others). 
171. Belsky et al., supra note 59, at 58–59. 
172. See Elinor Ostrom, Building Trust To Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small 
Steps To Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action, in GAMES, GROUPS, AND THE 
GLOBAL GOOD 207, 221 (Simon A. Levin ed., 2009) (discussing the role of context and 
structure in building trust and reciprocity in collective action). 
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Kickstarter project ever.
173
 Palmer raised enough money through the 
campaign to allow her to create the album, organize a tour, and pro-
duce and deliver the perks backers ordered. Palmer’s final profit on 
the project apparently neared $100,000.
174
 Like Double Fine, Palmer 
relied heavily on both value-added goods and services and a personal 
relationship with her fans to convince them to pay. Unlike Double 
Fine, however, once the project was produced, Palmer released it on 
her website under PWYW terms and a Creative Commons Attribution 
ShareAlike Non-Commercial license.
175
 Having already recouped her 
costs, Palmer was able to take this move with no risk that she would 
be out of pocket. The use of PWYW pricing enabled much greater 
distribution among Palmer’s audience. In this model, the social cost of 
deadweight loss typically associated with monopoly prices is almost 
eliminated.
176
 Palmer’s fans personalize this abstract gain, commonly 
expressing gratitude for being able to access the album for free when 
they could not otherwise afford it: “right now there is no possible way 
i can afford your album, even though i want to pay for it so so bad-
ly . . . . as soon as things [stabilize], i’m on my feet again, and i have a 
steady income flowing i will pay you every dollar you deserve.”
177
 
Strikingly, the proportion of Palmer’s fans who chose to support 
the project do not appear to resent free-riders. These people do not 
think of themselves as suckers, but instead often express their grati-
tude to Palmer for enabling them to participate and contribute to the 
production process.
178
 Conceivably, there may be people who do feel 
like suckers and either did not pledge or did not publicly complain, 
but the important point is that there were more than enough fans who 
wanted to be involved to fund Palmer’s production costs and the sub-
sequent free release of her album. 
While this form of using crowdfunding for the free release of cre-
ative works is not as popular as crowdfunding that operates on con-
                                                                                                                  
173. Tom Cheredar, Amanda Palmer Attracts over $1M in the Biggest Kickstarter Music 
Deal Ever, VENTUREBEAT (June 2, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/ 
2012/06/02/amanda-palmer-kickstarter-2/. 
174. See Amanda Palmer, All You Ever Wanted To Know About All This Kickstarter 
Money & Where It’s Going., KICKSTARTER (May 22, 2012), http://www.kickstarter.com/ 
projects/amandapalmer/amanda-palmer-the-new-record-art-book-and-tour/posts/232020. 
175. Palmer, Theatre, supra note 11. 
176. See Choong Hee Lee et al., Research on Public Remuneration of Open Content 
Based on Collective License, 14 INNOVATION: MGMT., POL’Y & PRAC. 576, 577 (2012) 
(discussing collective licensing as a means to fund openly licensed content, and arguing that 
the “major advantage of this institutional change is the removal of the social cost from mo-
nopolistic price-conditional access and usage”). 
177. Kimi Sutcliff, Comment to Theatre Is Evil Digital, AMANDAPALMER.NET (2012), 
http://amandapalmer.net/products/theatre-is-evil-digital/#comment-864542071. 
178. See, e.g., Tarena Simon, Comment to Amanda Palmer: The New Record, Art Book, 
and Tour, KICKSTARTER (June 1, 2012), https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/ 
amandapalmer/amanda-palmer-the-new-record-art-book-and-tour/comments?cursor= 
844391 (“i feel blessed to be a part of such wonderful history”). 
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ventional copyright principles, there are still many other successful 
examples. A wide variety of producers in various creative industries 
from around the world have been able to develop cooperative systems 
of funding professional commons-based cultural production, where 
the knowledge and cultural goods are made widely available at zero 
cost (and sometimes on “open”
179
 licensing terms that permit almost 
unlimited modification and reuse). The Spanish site Goteo is a 
crowdfunding site specifically designed to fund open projects and 
public goods ranging from renewable energy systems180 to openly 
licensed music.
181
 Thousands of producers have used other 
crowdfunding sites to fund openly licensed projects,
182
 including rec-
orded and sheet music,
183
 textbooks and other educational works,
184
 
software,
185
 and films.
186
 Other smaller, purpose-specific commons-
                                                                                                                  
179. Formally, “open” in this context means that the information resources are available 
at low or zero cost, with little restriction on reuse, modification, or distribution. See OPEN 
DEFINITION, http://opendefinition.org/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); The Free Software Defi-
nition, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html (last visit-
ed Dec. 18, 2014); cf. Debian Social Contract, DEBIAN, http://www.debian.org/ 
social_contract (last modified Apr. 29, 2014, 11:26:56 PM UTC) (providing alternate defi-
nitions of “free” that pre-date and inspired the Open Knowledge Foundation Network’s 
definition of “open”). 
180. CITCEA-UPC, Gasificador Opensource en el Chad: Renewable Electricity Genera-
tion by Using Residual Biomass Gasification in the Republic of Chad, GOTEO, 
http://goteo.org/project/gasificador-opensource-en-el-chad (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
181. See, e.g., Sunnare, Colabora en el Primer Disco de Sunnare: Help Finance Our 
New Album, “Unlocked”!, GOTEO, http://goteo.org/project/colabora-en-el-primer-disco-de-
sunnare1 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (a campaign to fund the production of an openly li-
censed album by Spain-based band Sunnare). 
182. For a list of Kickstarter projects that feature Creative Commons licensing, see Crea-
tive Commons, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/pages/creativecommons (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
183. See, e.g., Aaron Dunn, Set Chopin Free, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/Musopen/set-chopin-free (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) 
(providing both an online database of public domain sheet music and an effort to record and 
freely release Chopin’s music). 
184. See, e.g., Jeremy Hansen, The Rook’s Guide to C++ — A Creative Commons-
Licensed Text, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/261336366/the-rooks-
guide-to-c-a-creative-commons-licensed-t (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (a successfully fund-
ed and complete campaign to provide a computer programming textbook); Smarthistory: A 
Multimedia Web-Book About Art and Art History, SMARTHISTORY, 
http://smarthistory.khanacademy.org/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (a successfully 
Kickstarter-funded online history encyclopedia which is free for the public to access and 
whose entries are Creative Commons-licensed). 
185. Better-known projects include nonprofit Facebook alternative Diaspora, which was 
successfully funded on Kickstarter in 2010 after raising $200,641 against its goal of $10,000 
but struggled to attract market success after completion. Maxwell Salzberg, Decentralize the 
Web with Diaspora, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/mbs348/ 
diaspora-the-personally-controlled-do-it-all-distr (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); see also Wel-
come to CFFSW, CROWDFUNDED FREE SOFTWARE (Jan. 7, 2014), http://cffsw. 
modernthings.org/ (a database of openly licensed software crowdfunding projects). 
186. See, e.g., Bassam Kurdali, The Tube Open Movie, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1331941187/the-tube-open-movie (last visited Dec. 
18, 2014) (a successfully funded “experimental animation”). 
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crowdfunding sites have also emerged, bringing people together to 
pay the costs of producing open works for the benefit of others.
187
 
At a much larger scale, Wikimedia runs an annual fund-raising 
drive to “keep Wikipedia free”
188
 to pay for the ongoing costs of run-
ning Wikipedia. Wikimedia’s income is derived almost entirely from 
donations,
189
 most of which come from individual donors.
190
 In the 
field of scholarly publishing, universities, learned societies, philan-
thropic funds, and public grant-making agencies provide substantial 
support for the costs of publishing over 10,000 open access academic 
journals, which make more than 1.7 million scholarly articles availa-
ble for free to the world at large.
191
 The Sponsoring Consortium for 
Open Access Publishing in Particle Physics (“SCOAP
3
”) project, led 
by CERN, has brought together a consortium of “more than a thou-
sand libraries, funding agencies and research consortia across the 
world”
192
 and negotiated an agreement with the publishers of ten 
journals to publish the great majority of research articles in particle 
physics as open access for three years from 2014.
193
 Knowledge Un-
latched, a similar project in the humanities and social sciences, has 
signed up nearly 300 libraries around the world to its pilot program to 
publish twenty-eight monographs from established presses under open 
access licenses.194 Other examples abound in academia, including 
encyclopedias
195
 and news outlets
196
 that use collaborative funding 
                                                                                                                  
187. See, e.g., UNGLUE.IT, supra note 57 (crowdfunding open access book publishing); 
The Open Game Art Bundle, COMMONLY.CC, http://open.commonly.cc/ (last visited Dec. 
18, 2014) (crowdfunding the public domain release of computer game art assets). 
188. From Wikipedia Founder Jimmy Wales, WIKIMEDIA, https://wikimediafoundation. 
org/wiki/Keep_Wikipedia_Free (last modified Nov. 14, 2011, 10:27 PM). 
189. In 2013, $44.7 million of Wikimedia’s $48.6 million revenue came from “donations 
and contributions.” Financial Reports/Financial Statements Ending June 30 2013 and  
2012, WIKIMEDIA, https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Financial_Reports/Financial_ 
Statements_Ending_June_30_2013_and_2012 (last modified Nov. 12, 2014, 4:42 PM). 
190. See, e.g., Megan Hernandez, Wikimedia Foundation Releases Detailed Report on 
2012 Fundraiser, WIKIMEDIA BLOG (June 4, 2013), http://blog.wikimedia.org/2013/06/04/ 
wikimedia-foundation-releases-detailed-report-on-2012-fundraiser/ (reporting over 2 mil-
lion individual donations during the 2012 and March 2013 Wikipedia fundraising cam-
paign). 
191. See DIRECTORY OF OPEN ACCESS JOURNALS, http://www.doaj.org/ (last visited Dec. 
18, 2014). 
192. Richard Van Noorden, Open-Access Deal for Particle Physics: Consortium Brokers 
Agreement with 12 Journals, 489 NATURE 486, 486 (2012). 
193. See Open Access Publishing Initiative, SCOAP3, To Start on 1 January 2014, CERN 
PRESS OFFICE (Dec. 5, 2013), http://press.web.cern.ch/press-releases/2013/12/open-access-
publishing-initiative-scoap3-start-1-january-2014. 
194. See Press Release, Knowledge Unlatched, supra note 14. 
195. See Edward Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A University/Library 
Partnership in Support of Scholarly Communication and Open Access, 67 COLL. RES. LIBR. 
NEWS 502, 502 (2006) (describing university and library funding for an online academic 
encyclopedia). 
196. See The Conversation: 2012 Stakeholder Report, THE CONVERSATION, 
https://c15119308.ssl.cf2.rackcdn.com/2012_Stakeholder_Report_The_Conversation.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
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models to make professionally-produced resources available to the 
public. 
The above are all examples of “peaceful revolutions”: systems of 
production that greatly increase the dissemination of knowledge and 
culture by flipping copyright business models to cooperative ones.
197
 
The great promise of these systems is their potential to sustain com-
mons-based models of production for the typical core of costly, mass-
market professional production in the creative industries. If they suc-
ceed, there is a good chance that cooperative models represent a more 
efficient and more desirable mechanism of coordinating production 
than conventional copyright. 
A. Cooperation at Scale: Three Structural Changes 
So far, we have seen a series of examples of one-off, isolated ex-
periments. Could they work at a larger scale? While the social norms 
discussed in Part III above (fairness, esteem, guilt, shame, and recip-
rocity) and selflessness may suffice for small-scale projects, they may 
not be sufficient to sustain cooperation at scale. Even if there are 
enough conditional cooperators in a population to routinely fund the 
costs of large-scale cultural production, behavioral public goods ex-
periments show that while people may cooperate at first,
198
 condition-
al cooperators reduce their contributions over time in the presence of 
free-riders.
199
 Why then would we have any reason to believe that 
people would voluntarily pay “when they know that their contribu-
tions also support hundreds, if not thousands, of free riders?”
200
 
In the sections that follow, I explain three categories of structural 
approaches that suggest that cooperation may be workable at scale 
and over time for funding commons production in the core of profes-
sional cultural production. If people decide whether to free-ride based 
on both their self-interest and their evaluation of the chance that oth-
ers will cooperate as well, then increasing cooperation requires target-
ing their incentives or insulating the cooperators from the free-riders, 
within a specific project or as facilitated by a formal institution. The 
first category focuses on encouraging self-interested cooperation by 
providing incentives for the rational actors who value the goods to 
                                                                                                                  
197. SUBER, supra note 18, at 142–47 (note that while Suber was specifically discussing 
large-scale collaborative institutions, the analysis is more broadly applicable). 
198. Ostrom, supra note 74, at 5 (“Most experimental studies of social dilemmas with the 
structure of a public-goods provision problem have found levels of cooperative actions in 
one-shot games, or in the first rounds of a repeated game, that are significantly above the 
predicted level of zero.”). 
199. See Fehr & Gintis, supra note 15, at 50; Fischbacher et al., supra note 80, at 401, 
403; Herbert Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION AND 
HUM. BEHAV. 153, 160–61 (2003). 
200. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incen-
tives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1121, 1150 (2003). 
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contribute rather than free-ride. The second examines how coopera-
tors can be protected from free-riders who sap their motivation to par-
ticipate. The third category considers how groups can build more 
formal institutions to enable large-scale cooperation over time by cre-
ating social norms and enforcement mechanisms that facilitate repeat-
ed interactions between relatively stable groups of actors. Each of 
these methods works because markets for copyrighted goods are mal-
leable social structures that can be modified to enhance cooperation. 
1. Economic Incentives To Cooperate 
The first route to ensuring that self-interested, rationally-acting 
people
201
 do not spoil the motivations of conditional cooperators is to 
provide them with incentives to cooperate. Cooperation is then mutu-
ally beneficial, as the party who bears the costs of cooperation also 
derives a direct benefit that outweighs the cost.
202
 One of the most 
common ways to convince consumers to pay for free goods is to 
cross-subsidize from complementary value-added goods and ser-
vices.
203
 This is at the core of Masnick’s “connect with fans + reason 
to buy” (CwF + RtB) algorithm, which relies on using the visibility of 
infinitely reproducible intangibles to increase demand for scarce 
goods and services.
204
 In both commons and conventional 
crowdfunding models, for example, backers might get value-added 
goods or services that are denied to the general public — private or 
club goods that provide a strong incentive to pay.
205
 For creative pro-
jects, contributors might get exclusive perks such as limited editions, 
backstage passes, autographed works, having their name listed in the 
film credits, and so on.206 While good data is not available, cross-
                                                                                                                  
201. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–8 (2008) (drawing a distinction between 
humans and “econs” where “econs” respond to incentives and always behave according to 
rational economic principles). 
202. See West et al., supra note 71, at 418. 
203. See Hal R. Varian, Public Goods and Private Gifts (July 11, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/2013/kick.pdf. 
204. See Masnick, supra note 50 (arguing that content creators should “[s]et the infinite 
components free, syndicate them, make them easy to get — all to increase the value of the 
scarce components”); Masnick, supra note 48. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 52 
(explaining cross-subsidies in “free” business models). 
205. See Paul Belleflamme et al., Individual Crowdfunding Practices, 15 VENTURE 
CAPITAL 313, 317 (2013) (contrasting equity- and donation-based crowdfunding with re-
ward-based crowdfunding, which “allows crowdfunders to receive a nonfinancial benefit in 
return to their financial contributions (e.g., credit on an album, pre-ordering of products or 
services)”). 
206. See, e.g., Kappel, supra note 54, at 376 (In return for their funding, “financial con-
tributors typically receive ‘patronage perks’ such as use of their name in the film credits or 
album liner notes, advanced autographed copies of the work, or backstage access at a per-
former’s show.”); Nine Inch Nails, Ghosts — Order Options, NINE INCH NAILS: GHOSTS I-
IV, http://ghosts.nin.com/main/order_options (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (Nine Inch Nail’s 
PWYW scheme for Ghosts I–IV allowed consumers to pay up to $300 for an ultra-deluxe 
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subsidies seem to play some important role in encouraging audiences 
to pay for works they could otherwise get for free. Participants fre-
quently discuss their desires for limited edition goods — this example 
from a backer of Amanda Palmer’s Kickstarter campaign is indica-
tive: “After days of dithering, I just upped my pledge to $125, ‘cause I 
reeeeeeeally want that art book.”
207
 For people who value the exclu-
sive goods or services, then, cross-subsidies transform the prisoner’s 
dilemma of choosing whether to pay for cultural works into a much 
less problematic consumer transaction.
208
 In cases where demand is 
high enough, this can be a very successful way to fund the production 
of open works.
209 
A different approach relies on producers raising funds ex ante and 
withholding the production or release of free cultural works until a 
certain threshold has been raised. This is the “Street Performer Proto-
col”:
210
 if all goes well, once the threshold has been met, the new 
work is released to the public for free, to the mutual benefit of crea-
tors, publishers, patrons, and, importantly, also to the free-riders who 
might enjoy the work but did not contribute to its funding. Stephen 
King provided one of the first high-profile tests of this new model 
with his serialized novel The Plant in 2000.
211
 Readers had the option 
to download each installment for free, but King asked that readers pay 
at least $1 for each download of the first three installments of the 
work and at least $2 for each download of the following three install-
ments.
212
 King promised that so long as at least seventy-five percent 
of downloaders continued to pay, he would continue to write install-
ments.
213
 
                                                                                                                  
limited edition package); Amanda Palmer, Smurf-Tits & Scientology Oh My (The 
Kickstarter Q&A Part 2), KICKSTARTER (May 24, 2012), https://www.kickstarter.com/ 
projects/amandapalmer/amanda-palmer-the-new-record-art-book-and-tour/posts?page=5 
(offering not only physical goods and signed limited editions, but also higher rewards such 
as hosting a party at the home of backers who paid $5000 or holding an art-sitting to paint a 
canvas portrait of backers who paid $10,000). 
207. Valerie Allen, Comment to Amanda Palmer: The New Record, Art Book, and Tour, 
KICKSTARTER (May 31, 2012), https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/amandapalmer/ 
amanda-palmer-the-new-record-art-book-and-tour/comments?cursor=843377. 
208. But see Farchy, supra note 31, at 251 (raising concerns that cross-subsidization 
models enhance the power of manufacturers and distributors). 
209. But see Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 881, 913 (2011) (doubting the overall impact of cross-subsidies in funding 
creative projects). 
210. See John Kelsey & Bruce Schneier, The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Cop-
yrights, 4 FIRST MONDAY (June 1999), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ 
view/673; Kylie J. Veale, Internet Gift Economies: Voluntary Payment Schemes as Tangible 
Reciprocity, 8 FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 2003), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/ 
article/view/1101. 
211. See William A. Fischer, Stephen King and the Publishing Industry’s Worst Night-
mare, 13 BUS. STRATEGY REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
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King’s experiment illustrates how producers can restructure mar-
kets for digital goods to escape the prisoner’s dilemma. In a prisoner’s 
dilemma, the worst possible outcome is to be a sucker who cooperates 
when others do not.214 By contrast, in the Street Performer Protocol, 
where the good has not yet been produced, the worst possible out-
come — at least for fans — is that too many people free-ride and the 
good is not produced. This is a “snowdrift game,” so called because 
when you are faced with a snowdrift blocking a road, it is better to 
shovel it out of the way than to do nothing, better still if everyone 
shovels, best if someone else shovels while you do nothing, and worst 
for everyone if nobody picks up a shovel.215 
Unlike the prisoner’s dilemma of conventional cultural produc-
tion, we can expect a positive level of cooperation in ex ante 
crowdfunding models where the benefit of getting access to the final 
product outweighs the cost of being a sucker.216 Fans of Stephen 
King’s work who want to see The Plant produced, for example, have 
a strong incentive to pay King’s ransom. Their best strategy is to 
sometimes voluntarily pledge, with a probability that takes into ac-
count the cost/benefit ratio and the number of other people who also 
need to pledge for the project to succeed.
217
  
Wikipedia provides an interesting example of a very successful 
Street Performer Protocol. Each fundraising campaign, Wikimedia 
representatives — and particularly the founder, Jimmy Wales — 
make credible threats that if sufficient donations are not received, 
Wikimedia may be forced to run advertisements or charge for access 
to pay Wikipedia’s ongoing costs.
218
 Each year so far, Wikimedia has 
exceeded its fundraising targets, suggesting that users are willing to 
bear costs to “keep Wikipedia free.”
219
  
These examples show two forms of incentives that should be able 
to raise rates of participation in one-shot interactions. While Wikipe-
dia has been wildly successful, Stephen King’s experiment ended 
                                                                                                                  
214. Hardin, supra note 162, at 473–74. 
215. D.F. Zheng et al., Cooperative Behavior in a Model of Evolutionary Snowdrift 
Games with N-Person Interactions, 80 EPL 18002, 18002-p1 (2007); Kollock, supra note 
108, at 187–90; Irwin Lipnowski & Shlomo Maital, Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public 
Good as the Game of “Chicken,” 20 J. PUB. ECON. 381, 384 (1983) (describing so called 
“chicken” games, when you gain the most if the oncoming truck swerves and you do not 
have to go out of your way to avoid it, but lose the most in the ensuing crash when both 
people choose to not to swerve). 
216. See Marco Archetti & István Scheuring, Game Theory of Public Goods in One-Shot 
Social Dilemmas Without Assortment, 299 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 9, 10 (2012); Michael 
Doebeli & Christoph Hauert, Models of Cooperation Based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
the Snowdrift Game, 8 ECOLOGY LETTERS 748, 748 (2005). 
217. See Archetti & Scheuring, supra note 216, at 17 (discussing optimal strategy in an 
n-person volunteer’s dilemma). 
218. Mak et al., supra note 97, at 2–3 (arguing that “PWYW can transform a private 
good . . . into a public good”). 
219. See WIKIMEDIA, supra note 188. 
174  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 28 
 
 
sourly: King eventually canceled the project after pay-through rates 
for the fourth installment dropped to forty-six percent.
220
 The Plant 
was never published, and both King and his audience were disap-
pointed. This might go some of the way to explaining why few high-
profile producers have tried this model since. Theoretically, however, 
using one or both approaches — ex ante funding and value-added 
goods and services — should be sufficient to increase rates of partici-
pation amongst the group of participants who would usually free-ride.  
2. Insulating Cooperators Through Positive Assortment 
Conditional cooperators do not like being suckers.
221
 While peo-
ple may be happy to cooperate when others do, in a well-mixed popu-
lation, cooperation is difficult because cooperators are surrounded by 
free-riders who will take advantage of their generosity.
222
 Importantly, 
however, our cultural landscape is not well-mixed. The structure of a 
producer’s social network is likely to have a strong effect on rates of 
cooperation.
223
 Everything else being equal, the lower the proportion 
of free-riders in any given group, the higher rates of cooperation are 
likely to be.
224
 Simulations suggest that high thresholds of cooperation 
will be easier to achieve where social network connectivity is low and 
cooperators do not have to interact with a large number of free-
riders.
225
 By insulating cooperators from free-riders, small communi-
ties may also increase the likelihood that prosocial norms will emerge 
and become accepted, as compared to large, heterogeneous networks 
where these norms may be more actively contested.  
The implication is that voluntary payment schemes based on reci-
procity are much more likely to be successful if participants feel as if 
they are interacting directly with the artist-producer or with a select 
in-group of cooperators. It might be that in many cases, the sense of a 
personal connection would be sufficient to encourage participants to 
pay despite the fact that a broader mass of people choose to free-ride. 
When Amanda Palmer spoke about the relationship between her and 
                                                                                                                  
220. See David D. Kirkpatrick, A Stephen King Online Horror Tale Turns into a Mini-
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/ 
11/29/business/a-stephen-king-online-horror-tale-turns-into-a-mini-disaster.html. 
221. See Gordon, supra note 84, at 746, and accompanying text. 
222. See Fischbacher et al., supra note 80, at 397, 403. 
223. See generally Lars Carlsson & Annica Sandström, Network Governance of the 
Commons, 2 INT’L J. COMMONS 33 (2008) (discussing the importance of social network 
structures to successful collective action in natural resource commons). 
224. See Devesh Rustagi et al., Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain 
Success in Forest Commons Management, 330 SCIENCE 961, 962 (2010) (reporting that 
cooperation in forest management in Ethiopia was lower in groups with higher proportions 
of free-riders). 
225. Hisashi Ohtsuki et al., A Simple Rule for the Evolution of Cooperation on Graphs 
and Social Networks, 441 NATURE 502, 504 (2006) (“In particular, more cooperation should 
emerge if connectivity is low.”); see also Corina E. Tarnita et al., Evolutionary Dynamics in 
Set Structured Populations, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8601, 8603 (2009). 
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the 25,000 fans who backed her record, and about the perceived fair-
ness of the bargains between them, she spoke in terms of a fairness 
negotiated within a community. She clearly differentiates a consensu-
al norm between the in-group and the mounting criticism by a larger, 
external group of commentators who saw her relationship with fans 
and collaborators as exploitative: “[The critics] weren’t with us . . . , 
and they couldn’t see the exchange that was happening between me 
and my crowd, an exchange that was very fair to us but alien to 
them.”
226
 
Palmer’s fans appeared to react directly and positively to the con-
nection they felt to her; many expressed their love and gratitude, 
which Palmer occasionally reciprocated. The connection felt by fans 
was palpable — for example, this comment is illustrative: “You’re 
what a real rock star should be, someone who loves their fans as much 
as their fans love them.”
227
 It would seem that many of Palmer’s 
backers, when they are thinking about reciprocity, are not thinking 
about abstract free-riders who will take advantage of them, but of 
Palmer herself, whom they just want to support. That fans feel such 
love for artists should not come as a surprise, and it is by no means 
certain that a fan who supports a new production from their favorite 
artists would necessarily feel aggrieved if others were able to access 
that work for free. 
We see similar phenomena in communities of cooperators who 
are able to develop a strong sense of identity and shared purpose. 
Commons projects sometimes use this to great effect by creating an 
in-group228 of cooperators from around the world, where prosocial 
norms can be created that encourage cooperation in the face of large 
rates of free-riding amongst the broader community.
229
 In a natural 
resource commons, where resources are finite collective goods, limit-
ing the proportion of free-riders is crucial because free-riders leave 
everyone else worse off.
230
 In information commons, on the other 
hand, the extent to which cooperators within each of these groups 
                                                                                                                  
226. Amanda Palmer: The Art of Asking, TED (Feb. 2013), http://www.ted.com/talks/ 
amanda_palmer_the_art_of_asking. 
227. See Meg Regine, Comment to Amanda Palmer: The New Record, Art Book, and 
Tour, KICKSTARTER (June 6, 2012), https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/amandapalmer/ 
amanda-palmer-the-new-record-art-book-and-tour/comments?cursor=870202. 
228. See Belsky et al., supra note 59, at 39–40 (“There is work in social psychology and 
neuroscience on social preferences, such as empathy and solidarity, or in-group bias . . . all 
of which provide different perspectives on why we cooperate, and what aspects of the sys-
tems we inhabit influence the degree to which we cooperate.”). 
229. See, e.g., E. GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING FREEDOM 12 (2013) (explaining the 
way in which prosocial sharing norms are developed and maintained through extensive 
initiation and public debate in the Debian free software project). 
230. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 91 (1990) (“At the least, those 
who invest in the [common pool resources] may not receive as high a return as they ex-
pected. At the worst, the actions of others could destroy the resource itself.” Excluding free-
riders is thus necessary to preserve the resource.). 
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feels aggrieved by free-riders is largely a matter of perspective, and 
this can be heavily mediated by the group. Wikipedians and free soft-
ware developers, for example, do not feel like suckers in the face of 
huge numbers of people who benefit from their work but do not con-
tribute to the community. Some of these groups do feel aggrieved 
when commercial users free-ride and do not reciprocate,
231
 but others 
develop different norms that support almost unlimited free-riding.
232
  
Similar principles are likely to apply for groups specifically de-
signed to fund the open production of cultural works. Unglue.it, for 
example, is a crowdfunding platform that allows users (“ungluers”) to 
contribute to the costs of publishing open access books. Unglue.it’s 
website proclaims its mission is to “share their books with the 
world,”233 and the narratives used to sell books are explicitly framed 
in terms of providing the benefits of a particular book to others.
234
 
While more research remains to be done, it seems reasonable to sug-
gest that if cooperators are able to self-select into sets where either 
they rarely have to interact with free-riders or where they can develop 
prosocial norms that actually encourage free-riding, the proportion of 
cooperators may not be as important as their absolute number and 
degree to which they are able to cluster together.
235
 The long-tail ef-
fect of the Internet is also likely to help here, enabling producers to 
reach a much wider audience and larger numbers of people with ec-
lectic tastes, potentially making viable projects that could not be fund-
ed in conventional markets.
236
 In theory at least, at any given 
                                                                                                                  
231. The main innovation of the GNU General Public License (“GPL”) was to prevent 
this form of free-riding by developing a “copyleft” norm, which effectively discriminates 
between commercial users who create new works but share their improvements back with 
the community and those who do not. See Brian Fitzgerald & Nicolas Suzor, Legal Issues 
for the Use of Free and Open Source Software in Government, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 412, 
413–14 (2005); Clark D. Asay, The General Public License Version 3.0: Making or Break-
ing the Foss Movement?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265, 276 (2008) (describ-
ing changes to further limit forms of free-riding, including “Tivoization,” in the later 
Version 3 of the GPL). 
232. See Stefano De Paoli et al., Free and Open Source Licenses in Community Life: Two 
Empirical Cases, 13 FIRST MONDAY (Oct. 6, 2008), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/ 
index.php/fm/article/view/2064/203 (discussing the way in which licensing norms are nego-
tiated in free software communities). 
233. UNGLUE.IT, supra note 57. 
234. See, e.g., The Digital Public Domain: Foundations for an Open Culture, UNGLUE.IT 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014), https://unglue.it/work/136338/ (“[Open Book Publishers] be-
lieve[s] that knowledge is for sharing. We are a non-profit, Open Access publisher, commit-
ted to making high-quality research freely available to readers around the world.”). 
235. See Ostrom, supra note 74, at 13 (“Contingent agreements do not need to include all 
those who benefit. The benefit to be obtained from the contribution of Y proportion of those 
affected may be so substantial that some individuals are willing to contribute so long as Y 
proportion of others also agree and perform.”). 
236. See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING 
LESS OF MORE 19–24 (2006); Max O. Souza et al., Evolution of Cooperation Under N-
Person Snowdrift Games, 260 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 581, 581–82 (2009) (developing a 
model that predicts that successful cooperation may be more likely when the threshold is 
can be met by a small proportion of the population, although coordination costs increase). 
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threshold, a larger group will more easily form a critical mass, since a 
larger number of people will place a disproportionately high value on 
the good.
237
 
3. Cooperative Institutions: Large-Scale, Stable Cooperation over 
Time 
Most of the experiments discussed so far are one-shot: they pro-
vide an open offer to a large number of people, some of whom choose 
to cooperate for a specific purpose. If the number of people who 
choose to pay is sufficiently large, the project is successful. While 
these models may work for individual projects, they may not always 
provide a predictably stable model of funding for large-scale sustained 
productions. By changing the rules of the game, groups of individuals 
can change prisoner’s dilemmas into forms that enable cooperation at 
scale and over time.
238
 
Groups can institute various mechanisms — particularly, social 
rewards and punishments — to discourage free-riding and encourage 
cooperation.
239
 The study of collective action in natural resource 
commons (e.g., fisheries, forestry, irrigation water, grazing land) has 
shown that there are generalizable characteristics of the institutional 
structures and rules that enable successful, long-term cooperation.
240
 
While we do not yet have comparable long-term data, there is good 
reason to believe that similar rules might apply for maintaining coop-
eration in the production of knowledge goods.
241
 While the nature of 
the goods that are produced, managed, and shared among communi-
ties differs significantly between natural resource commons and in-
formation commons, the patterns of institutional structures that enable 
humans to cooperate are likely to have many shared characteristics. 
The SCOAP
3
 and Knowledge Unlatched systems are examples of 
complex negotiated arrangements designed to sustain long-term coop-
                                                                                                                  
237. See GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 52 (Jon Elster & Michael S. McPherson eds., 1993) 
(“[T]he expected number of individuals who are willing and able to give at any specific 
contribution level will always be higher for a larger group.”). 
238. See Ostrom, supra note 74, at 8 (“Extensive research on how individuals have gov-
erned and managed common-pool resources has documented the incredible diversity of 
rules designed and enforced by participants themselves to change the structure of underlying 
social-dilemma situations.”). 
239. See David G. Rand et al., Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation, 325 
SCIENCE 1272, 1272 (2009) (finding that in public goods games, rates of participation and 
average payoffs were higher when participants could reward other participants for coopera-
tive behavior than when participants only had the choice to punish or defect). 
240. See OSTROM, supra note 230, at 58–93, 143–81. 
241. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING 
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 14–15 (Charlotte Hess & 
Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultur-
al Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 657 (2010). 
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eration. In each case, because the materials that libraries pay for are 
ultimately released for free to the public at large, each individual li-
brary has an incentive to free-ride rather than cooperate. In order to be 
successful, libraries, like individual users, need both rational incen-
tives (in the form of current or future savings) and some assurance 
that they will not be unfairly subsidizing the costs of publishing while 
other institutions free-ride. Both schemes are set against a background 
social imperative to make academic research as broadly available as 
possible.
242
 Both schemes are also set in opposition to a particularly 
pressing set of problems: the rapidly increasing costs of journal sub-
scriptions
243
 and the crisis in humanities publishing caused by increas-
ing costs and shrinking sales of monographs and preventing scholars 
from disseminating their work.
244
 Both models rely on libraries, as the 
key purchasers of academic publishing, to commit to a new structure 
in the hope of providing a better long-term publishing model. 
Knowledge Unlatched also provides clear incentives; libraries are 
offered books at a per-title cost of sixty dollars or less (significantly 
lower than standard prices for academic books) and offered discounts 
for each book they have already purchased in hardcopy or electronic 
versions.
245
 SCOAP
3
, by contrast, attempts to limit free-riding through 
a complex scheme that creates thresholds for funding levels in each 
country according to their share of global physics outputs.
246
 Both the 
SCOAP
3
 and Knowledge Unlatched projects have successfully 
launched initial pilot programs.
247
 While their long-term sustainability 
has not yet been proven, the fact that both projects have been able to 
secure agreements from hundreds of libraries is extremely promis-
ing.
248
 
                                                                                                                  
242. See JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO 
RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP xii (William Y. Arms ed., 2006) (reasoning that “[a] com-
mitment to the value and quality of research carries with it a responsibility to extend the 
circulation of such work as far as possible and ideally to all who are interested in it and all 
who might profit by it”) (emphasis removed). 
243. See, e.g., Harvard Faculty Advisory Council, Faculty Advisory Council Memoran-
dum on Journal Pricing: Major Periodical Subscriptions Cannot Be Sustained, HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY (Apr. 17, 2012), http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982& 
tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup143448 (arguing that rising journal subscription costs are unsus-
tainable even for extremely well-funded research libraries); Martha Kyrillidou & Shaneka 
Morris, ARL Statistics 2008–2009 11 (Ass’n Res. Libr. 2011) (reporting a 381% increase in 
journal subscription costs and an 87% increase in monograph acquisition costs from 1986 to 
2009). 
244. See TOBY MILLER, BLOW UP THE HUMANITIES 52, 51 (2012). 
245. How It Works, KNOWLEDGE UNLATCHED, http://www.knowledgeunlatched.org/ 
about/how-it-works/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
246. BIANCO ET AL., supra note 13, at 20. 
247. SCOAP3 Repository Launches in Beta, SCOAP3 (Feb. 17, 2014) http://scoap3.org/ 
news/scoap3-repository-launches-in-beta.html; Pilot Project, KNOWLEDGE UNLATCHED, 
http://www.knowledgeunlatched.org/about/pilot-project/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). 
248. See Current Partners, SCOAP
3, http://scoap3.org/participating-countries (last visit-
ed Dec. 18, 2014); Press Release, Knowledge Unlatched, supra note 14. 
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There are other important examples in the educational sector. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is funded through a combination 
of philanthropic grants and university library donations.
249
 The Con-
versation, an Australian not-for-profit online news publication, pro-
vides public access to professionally edited academic commentary 
and analysis.
250
 The Conversation is funded by philanthropic and gov-
ernment grants and partner universities.
251
 Universities have a strong 
incentive to see the work of their academics published to a broad au-
dience, but the dominant strategy for any given university is likely to 
be to free-ride, since The Conversation does not limit submissions to 
partner institutions.
252
 The fact that universities do choose to fund The 
Conversation shows that it is successful, even if some institutions 
free-ride by submitting the work of their academic authors without 
becoming a partner. 
Each of these institutional collective action approaches, both 
within and outside academia, promises a great potential for creating 
sustainable commons-based production processes. The mechanisms 
for such large-scale cooperation, however, have not been extensively 
tested or studied. It is by no means clear what types of commons-
based information production can be funded by private consortia, or 
how sustainable or scalable cooperation can be. Clearly, however, 
institutional cooperation is already working to fund some forms of 
open cultural production, and there is substantial demand, at least in 
academia, for large-scale experiments with commons-based funding 
mechanisms. 
B. A Hypothesis: Commons-Based Systems Outperform Conventional 
Copyright Systems 
There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that cooperative sys-
tems for coordinating cultural production are able to operate across a 
variety of creative industries at a diverse range of scales. The experi-
ments attempted so far provide ample proof of concept for the propo-
sition that these models can be successful. The outstanding questions 
are now about the extent to which these models can stretch and the 
implications they may present for copyright doctrine and policy. 
In order to explore the limits and implications of cooperation, I 
propose a hypothesis: commons-based systems of coordinating crea-
tive production are likely to outperform conventional copyright sys-
tems on measures of efficiency, fairness, and potential for human 
                                                                                                                  
249. Zalta, supra note 195, at 503. 
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flourishing. These three criteria encapsulate a particular view of copy-
right that focuses on its instrumental goal to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”
253
 Economic efficiency measures the ability 
of copyright to fulfill its core function of coordinating investment in 
cultural production. Beyond efficiency, part of the reason we care 
about copyright is our commitment to treating authors fairly.
254
 The 
final criterion provides a more substantive evaluation of the role of 
copyright in our society in promoting equality and freedom.
255
 Pro-
gress itself is not a fundamental good; rather, copyright is important 
because of the role it plays in helping people learn, play, and express 
themselves through culture.
256
 Unlike efficiency, this last criterion is 
sensitive to quality of expression, distributional concerns about cost 
and access, and the rules that limit how expression may be used and 
reused. Together, these criteria provide a more substantive consequen-
tialist evaluation of the role of copyright in supporting a just and at-
tractive culture. 
1. Efficiency 
Copyright is fundamentally and intractably inefficient. Structural-
ly, it allows producers to recoup their costs by enabling them to ex-
clude those who cannot afford to pay the price they set. By 
transforming expression from a public good into a private good, copy-
right necessarily limits the distribution of knowledge and culture 
throughout society.
257
 Because excluding free-riders comes at such a 
heavy cost,
258
 copyright “is a second best solution to market failure 
[but] there is no first best answer.”
259
 Within the paradigm of copy-
right law, while it is possible to optimize the balance between incen-
                                                                                                                  
253. U.S. CONST., art. I. § 8, cl. 8. 
254. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
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255. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
256. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) (discussing the creative process of artists and society’s creation of 
copyrights to protect creativity without a clear understanding of what creativity requires). 
257. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609, 616–17 (1962). 
258. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1049. But see Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, 
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257 (2007) (arguing that economic externalities are 
good for society). 
259. Ruth Towse, What We Know, What We Don’t Know and What Policy-Makers 
Would Like Us To Know About the Economics of Copyright, 8 REV. ECON. RES. ON 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 101, 105 (2011). 
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tives and access to an extent, there is always a trade-off, and underuti-
lization (deadweight loss) is unavoidable.
260
 Ultimately, it becomes 
impossible to increase access to information goods without diminish-
ing the incentives to invest in the production of new works — a self-
defeating strategy.
261
 
Commons-based models of cultural production, when they are 
successful, avoid the costly trade-off between incentives and ac-
cess.
262
 As compared to monopoly pricing under traditional copyright 
models, the potential benefits of making information goods available 
at their marginal cost of distribution (almost zero in the case of digital 
goods) are immense. The use of open licensing for copyrighted works 
enables widespread and practically unlimited dissemination and reuse 
of knowledge and cultural goods. Openly licensed goods also greatly 
reduce the transaction costs involved in seeking permission to use and 
reuse copyrighted works.
263
 Systems of production that are less reliant 
on copyright are likely to incur monitoring and enforcement cost. Eas-
ier access to creative content — lower prices and lower transaction 
costs — and a reduction in the power of established intermediaries to 
control distribution can also create opportunities for businesses who 
add value through disruptive innovation around interactions with ex-
isting content.
264
 
Under the “Pareto efficiency” test, a system is said to be more ef-
ficient than another if some people are made better off while nobody 
is made worse off.
265
 For example, the attempts by SCOAP
3
 and 
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263. Cf. Breyer, supra note 30, at 316–18. 
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Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 
(2002) (discussing the disruptive innovation of filesharing technologies and their potential 
impact on copyright law). 
265. For a discussion of Pareto efficiency, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
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REV. 1089, 1094–98 (1972). 
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Knowledge Unlatched to flip existing copyright production models to 
cooperative systems are likely Pareto-improvements if they work. 
Where existing budgets can be redirected through collective action, 
publishers are able to reduce risk and maintain (potentially appropri-
ately discounted) profits, libraries and institutions are left in a similar 
position, and the public gains a great deal through open access to 
scholarly works. 
Because the test forbids redistribution (no person may be made 
worse off),
266
 not all commons models will be Pareto-improvements. 
Almost all, however, are likely to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient improve-
ments. An outcome is said to be more efficient under the more relaxed 
Kaldor-Hicks criteria if any loss experienced by people made worse 
off is less than the gain experienced by those who are made better 
off.
267
 The winners must be theoretically able to fully compensate the 
losers, although there is no practical requirement to do so.
268
 
Amanda Palmer’s Kickstarter campaign, for example, is probably 
an improvement over Double Fine’s Broken Age campaign. In each of 
these cases, since consumers only pay what they want, we can assume 
that they are always getting a positive result. The benefits to the 
members of the public who are able to free-ride and receive access 
that they would not otherwise get, on the other hand, are quite sub-
stantial. By releasing her work under a Creative Commons license, 
Palmer enables much greater social value and downstream innovation 
than if she had, like Double Fine, continued to sell restrictive licenses 
to the work.
269
 On the producer’s side, it is impossible to say whether 
Palmer could have earned more by not making her album shareable — 
her PWYW revenue may or may not be less than the counterfactual. If 
she is no worse off, the result is a Pareto-improvement — some are 
better off, and nobody is worse off. Importantly, however, even if she 
is personally worse off, the result is likely to be a Kaldor-Hicks im-
provement. Once Palmer has received enough money to produce the 
album and make a reasonable profit, from the incentives perspective 
of copyright theory, any further gains are unproductive monopoly 
rents. Reducing the potential rents Palmer can extract, once the album 
has already been produced, merely adds to the consumer surplus.
270
 
                                                                                                                  
266. See generally Robert Nozick, Distributive Justice, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 45 (1973) 
(discussing the prohibition against redistribution). 
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269. See generally Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 258 (discussing the positive exter-
nalities of creativity and the limits imposed by property rights). 
270. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1046–47. 
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Similarly, if Double Fine were able to raise an amount through 
PWYW or crowdfunding that enabled it to achieve profits greater than 
or equal to the likely profits it could expect over the life of Broken 
Age, releasing it under an open license would be a Pareto-
improvement. If Double Fine were to raise less than their total ex-
pected profits, but more than the amount required to make the game, 
this would likely be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement. Only if Double 
Fine could not raise enough money to produce the game through vol-
untary payments would it potentially be a worse outcome. 
For the same reasons, Palmer’s model is, in isolation, superior to 
a conventional copyright production system. If a voluntary payment 
mechanism can raise enough funds to cover the producer’s fixed costs 
of production plus a reasonable profit, it will in almost all cases be 
more efficient than a system that enables an investor to obtain mo-
nopoly rents. In efficiency terms, at least when we only consider indi-
vidual productions in isolation, successful commons-based models 
must be more efficient than conventional copyright-based approaches. 
Importantly, however, these systems rely on producers making a dis-
tinct choice to potentially limit their revenue in order to generate 
greater public benefits. This suggests a key role for policy in provid-
ing incentives to encourage individuals and corporations to use these 
systems if they do turn out to be systematically more efficient. 
Whether these systems are more efficient ultimately depends on 
whether they are able to successfully fund a sufficient level and diver-
sity of cultural production. Much more research is required to under-
stand their complex effects. Some forms of cultural production may 
be more suited to voluntary payment schemes than others. Successful 
voluntary schemes tend to have loyal followings; the highly popular 
works of mass culture and niche producers with strong but small fan 
bases might be able to reliably raise the funds they need for their pro-
duction on a voluntary basis. These schemes have not yet been proven 
at the very largest scales of cultural production — the blockbuster 
films or videogames that require an initial investment of many mil-
lions of dollars. It is also not yet clear that there is sufficient audience 
loyalty to support the bulk of mass media in the middle range. For the 
proportion of content that is marginal — just breaking even or provid-
ing modest returns — PWYW or crowdfunding schemes may not 
work. They may also not work for socially valuable cultural content 
that does not enjoy a sufficiently strong market and has historically 
been supported by public subsidies.
271
 Similarly, for content that is 
currently predominantly funded by advertising revenue rather than 
consumer licensing, audiences may not be sufficiently loyal to support 
a shift in business model, although endorsement and advertising may 
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still play a crucial role in funding open content. If these schemes re-
duce monopoly rents, they will also reduce the ability of producers to 
invest the rents from one work into producing others works which are 
not commercially successful, further limiting the production of more 
marginal works. There are also likely to be many crowdfunded pro-
jects that are only partially funded in advance. For these projects, the 
amounts raised in advance might give producers sufficient assurance 
that a market exists to invest more money into production, in the hope 
of recouping that investment through copyright licensing; these pro-
jects may not be viable under a commons production model. Con-
versely, an ex-ante crowdfunding model enables producers to fail 
much more cheaply. If the market is not prepared to pay, instead of 
losing the entire production and marketing budget, their loss is limited 
to pre-production costs and the costs of running the crowdfunding 
campaign. 
Finally, some of the success in PWYW schemes can be attributed 
to the novelty of the model, which will likely to diminish if PWYW 
becomes more common. As we have seen, some people are motivated 
to pay in part to reciprocate a producer’s kind act in making their 
work available for free. This must be understood against a background 
of private licensing as the normal mode of distribution. If this back-
ground changes, a producer’s decision to use PWYW may be given 
less weight. At the same time, amounts voluntarily chosen are often 
anchored to a reference point for traditional licensing models. As 
PWYW becomes more common and more material is available legit-
imately for free or very cheaply, there is at least a suggestion that 
people may come to value digital goods less, and the amount they are 
willing to pay will accordingly decrease. These implications are as yet 
untested. 
There is sufficient reason to believe that commons-based volun-
tary payment mechanisms might be more efficient than traditional 
copyright-based production models. In terms of individual experi-
ments, we have seen that voluntary payment works across a number 
of different creative industries and over a broad range of levels, from 
small- to medium-scale productions. What is missing is an under-
standing of how voluntary payment mechanisms might work at scale, 
and how they interact with other mechanisms of funding cultural pro-
duction. The evaluation of efficiency must examine the systemic im-
pact of these systems, rather than a one-off comparison of successful 
productions. More research is accordingly required to understand the 
circumstances in which voluntary payment systems are likely to work 
and the likely effects of an increased proportion of commons-based 
systems on the creative industries as a whole. 
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2. Fairness and Human Flourishing 
Efficiency, by itself, is an insufficient measure to inform policy 
choices.
272
 Both short-term distributional effects and long-run effects 
on society are important. “[C]reative destruction,” as Julie Cohen 
says, “is nicest for those who do not have to undergo it.”
273
 Accord-
ingly, when evaluating commons-based systems of cultural produc-
tion, we must consider the implications for the producers who may be 
worse off in the short-term, as well as the systemic implications for 
the abstract public in the long-term. 
a. Distributional Effects on Producers 
In terms of short-run winners and losers, the distributional effects 
of more widespread use of commons-based systems of production 
require investigation. There are two main groups of distributional 
concerns: first, some genres, sectors, or industries may be more ame-
nable to voluntary payment schemes than others; and second, within 
these groups, producers may earn less on average or be subject to 
more skewed distributions of revenue under voluntary payment 
schemes than they would under copyright systems. In terms of distri-
butional effects between different producers, some forms of produc-
tion are likely to be much more successful than others,
274
 but we 
simply do not have the data yet to be sure. 
As for average payment and distribution of revenues, the answer 
is also unclear, but there is a colorable argument that the majority of 
producers will not be worse off. Except for the systems like SCOAP
3
 
and Knowledge Unlatched that simply redirect existing payments 
from conventional copyright licensing to fund commons-based pro-
duction, it is likely that producers in voluntary payment systems will, 
on average, forgo some profits. There is some evidence that PWYW 
schemes can be more profitable than conventional licensing in some 
cases,
275
 particularly in driving the sales of complementary goods,
276
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but this may depend on the producer’s stage in their career lifecy-
cle.
277
 It is safer to assume, for the moment, that commons-based 
schemes do in fact impose a greater cost on producers compared to 
conventional copyright licensing. The relevant question is how that 
cost is distributed. 
Conventional publishing models in the creative industries are not 
particularly fair for artists, even the small percentage who manage to 
develop successful audiences and professional contracts.
278
 Artists in 
the creative industries are characterized by a strong A-list/B-list phe-
nomenon, where small differences in perceived talent result in huge 
differences in rewards. Success in the creative industries is a lot-
tery.
279
 In order to mitigate the inherent risks of creative production, 
copyright aggregates money and power in publishers, allowing them 
to weather the inherent uncertainty by offsetting many flops against 
the occasional hit. As a result of this power asymmetry between pub-
lishers and artists, copyright over-compensates the tiny proportion of 
superstars and generally fails to provide adequate rewards to everyone 
else.
280
 
Commons-based systems may actually fare significantly better for 
authors on fairness grounds. Whether the distribution of revenue is 
more or less fair in commons-based systems than in conventional 
copyright models really depends upon the ability of commons-based 
systems to support a larger range of producers than the copyright in-
dustries currently do. In all likelihood, revenue in voluntary payment 
systems will also be skewed towards popular producers.
281
 If this is 
the case, commons-based systems may be no less fair than existing 
systems. Potentially, however, voluntary payment schemes may in-
clude an in-built, self-limiting trend that limits monopoly rents to su-
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perstars. In an openly licensed model, participants are asked to sup-
port the costs of production because it is the right thing to do; it may 
be that extremely successful producers will not be able to convince 
their audience that they deserve the same windfall profits that they 
receive under conventional licensing regimes. Of course, extremely 
popular producers are still likely to receive windfall profits through 
cross-subsidies and potentially through reciprocity norms — Amanda 
Palmer’s experience demonstrates that her fans were willing to award 
her much more than the $100,000 she originally asked for.
282
 It is at 
least conceivable, however, that commons-based systems might re-
duce monopoly rents disproportionately amongst superstars. Conceiv-
ably, if consumers spend less on superstars, there might also be more 
money available to support a more diverse range of producers. Re-
duced rents also means that publishers have less incentive to invest 
heavily in wasteful marketing races that crowd out marginal works.
283
 
If voluntary payment mechanisms were able to reduce some of 
the monopoly rents of producers and some of the power of publisher 
intermediaries, this would almost certainly be a good result.
284
 If this 
is the case, the average artist may benefit, even though the most suc-
cessful artists would suffer. Any system that evens out the highly 
skewed revenue curve of artists, even to a small extent, is likely to be 
better on distributional grounds.
285
 If, on the other hand, commons-
based crowdfunding does not substantially reduce rents, then these 
systems are likely to be neutral at worst on fairness grounds. Of 
course, if voluntary payment mechanisms are even more skewed in 
favor of superstars, then the average artist will be worse off. 
b. Distributional Effects on the Public 
Importantly, artists and producers are not the only parties who 
matter in a fairness calculus. If we start from the Rawlsian proposition 
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that justice requires a fair distribution of resources,
286
 the distribution-
al effect on the most disadvantaged people in society is of most im-
portance. Compared against openly licensed goods, monopoly pricing 
in conventional copyright systems makes disadvantaged people worse 
off. The availability of Wikipedia, for example, means that everyone 
can access a large body of knowledge for free. If the only encyclope-
dias available were subscription-based, the poorest members of socie-
ty would have to give up some other source of welfare to access that 
knowledge.
287
 
These distributional effects are particularly visible in terms of ac-
cess to information in developing countries. Open access to scholarly 
resources, for example, makes some of the world’s recorded scientific 
literature available to scholars who could not otherwise afford ac-
cess.
288
 Open educational resources improve access to textbooks and 
other materials for people in developing countries.
289
 Many other cul-
tural goods are often unaffordable for people in developing coun-
tries,
290
 and greater levels of free access can be extremely important 
for people who are disadvantaged in the market economy.291 
This reasoning can be extended to all knowledge and cultural 
goods. If total welfare (efficiency) is equal, we should prefer the con-
ditions in which information goods are available at or close to their 
marginal cost of distribution. More generally, if non-exclusive modes 
of production are feasible, we should only prefer copyright-based 
models if they lead to such an increase in quality, quantity, diversity, 
or aggregate welfare that the poorest members of society would be 
better off despite having to pay for access.
292
 Here too, then, we need 
a better understanding of the long-run effects of commons-based sys-
tems of production. 
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c. Capabilities for Human Flourishing 
Focusing on welfare alone is not sufficient for copyright policy. 
Access to knowledge and culture is important because it is an im-
portant part of living a good life.
293
 Human flourishing requires that 
people have a minimum threshold of capability to exercise the free-
doms required for a life of dignity and well-being.
294
 The capability to 
access and participate in culture is a fundamental component of flour-
ishing in a social life.
295
 It is also important for development: innova-
tion, creativity, and growth are dependent on the ability of people to 
learn from and improve on existing works.
296
 Fundamentally, access 
to knowledge and cultural goods is how we learn, and playing in the 
flow of culture is how we grow.
297
 
All else being equal, cultural works that are free to be shared, 
used and improved are much more conducive to human flourishing 
than copyrighted works released under conventional consumer licens-
es. We have already seen that free cultural and academic works enable 
people in disadvantaged groups to participate in education, culture, 
and economic society to an extent not otherwise possible. When copy-
right imposes a barrier to access to knowledge and culture, it limits 
the capacity of people to participate in society. 
Beyond the threshold of a basic level of access to participate in 
society, the impact of greater access is exponential rather than linear. 
Creativity and learning are reliant not just on deliberate experimenta-
tion, but on “serendipitous access and unexpected juxtapositions.”
298
 
The value of any piece of information increases with the connections 
that are available to other pieces of information.
299
 A model of cultur-
al abundance, with the legal ability to consume, borrow, adapt, remix, 
and re-express cultural works, helps to promote creativity, learning, 
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and cultural play to an extent that a model based on exclusivity and 
costly access never can.
300
 
For these reasons, all else being equal, systems that enable greater 
abundance and greater flow of knowledge and culture are likely to 
align more with human flourishing than other systems. The difficulty 
remains that all else is not equal — there are likely to be differences 
in the volume and types of production that can be supported by differ-
ent systems. Understanding what those differences are will be crucial 
for policy-making. 
C. A Better Consequentialism for Complex Systems 
On each of the three metrics considered here — efficiency, fair-
ness, and flourishing — there is a plausible hypothesis that commons-
based systems of production might result in better outcomes than con-
ventional copyright systems. For each, however, the analysis ultimate-
ly depends upon an evaluation of how these systems might interact 
with other modalities of production and an evaluation of their likely 
effects on levels and qualities of output in the creative industries as a 
whole. In order to come to any view about the desirability of encour-
aging commons-based systems of productions, we need a better un-
derstanding of the following: the types of content and industries that 
are amenable to voluntary payment systems; the likely distribution of 
revenues amongst producers; the impact of greater levels of access on 
future creators; the likely shifts in incentives; the effective limits on 
voluntary contributions; and the effects on publisher intermediaries. 
The analysis that is needed to test this hypothesis requires a new 
methodological approach. The conventional tools of economic wel-
fare analysis familiar to copyright have so far been unable to model 
long-run effects of any changes in copyright law, public policy, or 
industry practice.
301
 The essential problem is that the welfare effects 
of any given experiment or system cannot be assessed individually, 
but must instead be understood in the context of their effect on other 
actors.
302
 The creative industries are complex systems,
303
 in which 
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information is both an input and an output. In these complex systems, 
a heterogeneous but not well-mixed set of autonomous actors with 
diverse motivations and bounded rationality interact within a social 
network.
304
 Because “everything is connected to everything else”
305
 
and tightly coupled actions are governed by vicious or virtuous feed-
back circles, different content production systems will interact in 
counterintuitive ways. 
The biggest challenge lies in understanding the dynamic effects of 
different systems of cultural production. In order to understand the 
implications of any potential change to copyright, a new approach is 
required: one that can focus on the connection between actors (indi-
viduals and corporations) rather than the actors’ individual incentives 
familiar to neoclassical economic analyses of copyright.
306
 As a start-
ing point, since information is an input as well as an output in the cre-
ative industries, we might assume that lowering input costs through 
commons models is likely to enable more reuse and more aggregate 
production. Importantly, greater flow of information is also likely to 
enable greater innovation, which often involves the deliberate and 
unexpected combination of multiple sources of information.
307
 Simi-
larly, since creativity is always inspired by existing culture, enabling 
greater flow of information can lead to a more vibrant creative culture 
by creating new opportunities for serendipitous exposure not possible 
with higher transaction and licensing costs.
308
 But we have no evi-
dence and very little theory about how increased use of commons-
based production systems might interact with more conventional sys-
tems for coordinating and funding investment in cultural production. 
Any changes in public policy and industry practice are likely to in-
crease production in some systems and depress it in others, but the 
direction or magnitude of any of these effects is currently unknown. 
Given the gains that might be possible, this is a key and pressing area 
for new research. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The assumption at the core of copyright — that users are self-
interested, wealth-maximizing free-riders — is untenable. Humans are 
responsive to incentives, but we are also motivated by a desire to re-
ciprocate, a respect for social conceptions of fairness, a concern for 
the well-being of others, and a commitment to personal ethics. These 
diverse motivations lead individuals to actively reciprocate kindness 
and support the producers of creative works in circumstances where 
conventional copyright theory would not expect.  
In recent decades, the failure of copyright industries to take fair-
ness norms into account has been undermining the normative moral 
legitimacy of copyright law. The increasingly punitive nature of copy-
right enforcement, the disconnect between copyright law and morali-
ty, and the perceived unfairness with which copyright industries treat 
both artists and consumers is likely to substantially weaken the moti-
vations of individuals to pay for digital goods. The focus of copyright 
industries on strengthening copyright, then, is misguided. In order to 
encourage users not to free-ride, copyright industries should instead 
ensure that copyright law and practice is fair. 
The recognition that reciprocity and fairness norms play an im-
portant role in the motivations of people opens up the possibility of 
structural changes to copyright business models. Through coordina-
tion and cooperation, producers and audiences are sometimes able to 
develop successful systems for funding the production of creative 
works without the exclusivity that copyright requires. There is good 
reason to believe that these commons-based voluntary mechanisms 
might be workable at scale and potentially sustainable across a broad 
proportion of the creative industries. 
To the extent that commons-based systems of cultural production 
are effective, it is likely that they are also more efficient than conven-
tional copyright models. Commons production limits the costly under-
use and under-distribution of information goods that is largely una-
voidable under copyright. Because access to knowledge and culture is 
a fundamental component of a good life, commons models are also 
likely to be more conducive to helping people flourish. 
Ultimately, evaluating both the efficiency and the effect on flour-
ishing of commons models requires a much more detailed understand-
ing of knowledge and cultural commons. First, much depends on the 
extent to which these systems can be effective and sustainable, about 
which little is currently known. More research is required to under-
stand the conditions for successful cooperation in information com-
mons. Second, we need a much more sophisticated understanding of 
the interaction between different systems of production and the effect 
on total production, types of production, and levels of access. This 
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work requires a different approach to that which has typically in-
formed copyright theory — one that is sensitive to the complex rela-
tionships between actors involved in cultural production.  
Undertaking this work is of great importance. New technologies 
have given rise to a crisis in the traditional foundations of copyright 
by radically lowering the costs of production and distribution of crea-
tive works. This crisis continues to disrupt creative industries, and 
there are no easy answers about how the law should respond. At a 
time when so much is at stake in the content, technology, and Internet 
industries, it is vital that we understand the conditions under which 
copyright works effectively in order to get the balance right. Identify-
ing the extent to which new systems can deliver better outcomes for 
both producers and consumers of knowledge and cultural goods could 
present an extremely important policymaking opportunity.
  
 
